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Abstract
This dissertation studies the growth process from two different approaches. First, the measurement of
misallocation of production inputs in China is analyzed within the context of a dynamic investment model
that presents adjustment costs, with the purpose of assessing how much of the measured misallocation arises
due to the presence of these costs. Given that these are technological constraints, rather than imperfections in
markets or distortions arising from sub-optimal institutional features of a country, these are unavoidable.
Thus, the potential aggregate productivity gains that would arise in a static model if inputs were perfectly
allocated are over estimated, as these would be faced also by a social planner. Second, the product cycle as a
feature of economic growth is studied. Using historical data from the United States, a model where growth
occurs through innovations where production and entry-exit dynamics is estimated, and we use it to learn
about the features of the product cycle: the number of firms operating in a sector peaks at 19 years and the
number of firms that they imply varies greatly, yet how much output they imply is much more compact.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN MACROECONOMICS, FINANCE AND GROWTH
Gustavo Jose´ Camilo Vincent
Dirk Krueger
Joa˜o Gomes
This dissertation studies economic growth from two different approaches. First,
the measurement of misallocation of production inputs in China is analyzed within
the context of a dynamic investment model that presents adjustment costs, with the
purpose of assessing how much of measured misallocation arises due to the presence
of these costs. Given that these are technological constraints, rather than imper-
fections in markets or distortions arising from sub-optimal institutional features of
a country, these are unavoidable. Thus, the potential aggregate productivity gains
that would arise in a static model if inputs were perfectly allocated are over es-
timated, as these would be faced by a social planner. Second, the product cycle
as a feature of economic growth is studied. Using historical data from the United
States, a model where growth occurs through exogenous innovations with entry-exit
dynamics is estimated, and we use it to learn about the features of the product cy-
cle: the number of firms producing an innovation peaks at 19 years and the number
of firms that they are associated with varies greatly, yet how much output they
imply is much more homogeneous.
vi
Contents
List of Tables x
List of Figures xii
Introduction 1
1 Adjustment Costs, Financial Constraints and the Persistence of
Misallocation in China 3
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Misallocation and Adjustment Cost Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.1 Recursive Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3.2 Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3.3 Stationary Industry Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3.4 Sources of Misallocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.4 Estimation and Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.1 Functional Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.2 Method of Simulated Moments & Identification . . . . . . . 25
vii
1.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5.1 Counterfactuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.6 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2 Growth and Product Cycle 41
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2 Description of the dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.3 Stylized Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.4.1 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.4.2 Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4.3 Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.5 Balanced growth path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.5.1 Characteristics of equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.6 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.7 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.8 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.9 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.10 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Bibliography 79
Appendices 84
viii
A Details of the Computational Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
B Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
C Industry Labor Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
D Data Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
E Different Lags of TFPR Innovations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
F Industry TFPR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
G Aggregate TFP Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
H Derivation of the Aggregate Price Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
I Distribution of sales and firms across classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
J Truncation of the Log-Normal Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
ix
List of Tables
1.1 Statistics of TFPR deviations from industry means . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2 Dispersion of MRPK and Productivity Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3 Parameter Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.4 Method of Simulated Moments Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5 Aggregate Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.6 Counterfactual: Removing Adjustment Costs (Relative to Baseline) 36
1.7 Counterfactual: Equalizing Financial Constraints (Relative to Base-
line) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.8 Counterfactual: Adjustment Costs Experiment (Relative to Baseline) 39
2.1 Annualized Average Growth Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2 Lagged correlations with value added growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3 Targeted moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.4 Parameter Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.5 Nontargeted moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
x
E.1 Dispersion of MRPK and Productivity Shocks with One Lag of In-
novations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
E.2 Dispersion of MRPK and Productivity Shocks with Two Lags of
Innovations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
xi
List of Figures
1.1 Distribution of log(TFPR) Deviations from industry means . . . . 10
1.2 Path of dispersion of log(MRPK) and log(MRPL) . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1 Annualized growth rate of value added vs annualized growth rates of
employment and number of establishments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.2 Normalized sectoral shares of value added vs normalized sectoral
shares of employment and number of establishments . . . . . . . . . 67
2.3 Normalized sectoral shares of value added vs normalized sectoral
shares of employment and number of establishments . . . . . . . . . 68
2.4 Kernel densities of annualized sectoral growth by decade . . . . . . 69
2.5 Kernel density of sectoral variations in the log of value added by
decade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.6 Kernel density of sectoral variations in the log of value employment
by decade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.7 Kernel density of sectoral variations in the log of number of estab-
lishments by decade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
xii
2.8 Persistence in value added shares across decades . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.9 Annualized growth rates of value added vs establishments from the
simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.10 Normalized sectoral shares of value added vs normalized sectoral
shares of number of establishments from the simulations . . . . . . 73
2.11 Value added shares of decade t and t+ 1 from the simulations . . . 74
2.12 Value added shares of decade t and t+ 8 from the simulations . . . 75
2.13 Path of number of establishments after an innovation . . . . . . . . 75
2.14 Path of number of establishments after an innovation . . . . . . . . 76
2.15 Path of number of establishments after an innovation, sorted by value
added . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
xiii
Introduction
The growth process has been studied through many lenses, and misallocation of
inputs has been the focus of a recent series of paper, Restuccia and Rogerson [2008],
Hsieh and Klenow [2009], Midrigan and Xu [2014], Moll [2014], Hsieh and Song
[2015]. Misallocation refers to having producers of high productivity be relatively
small, while having low productivity producers operating at large scales. This is
measured by using the firm’s average products, when there is a lot of variation
in this variable, this is taken as evidence of the presence of misallocation. The
typical counterfactual asks the question: if capital were perfectly reallocated such
that average products of capital are equalized across firms, how much larger would
aggregate productivity be?
The first chapter extends previous research by Asker et al. [2015] that attempts
to measure what fraction of these productivity losses are generated by the presence
of adjustment costs of investment. These costs make adjusting the capital stock
both in response to productivity shocks that change the optimal size of the firm
and during the initial growth phase of the firm more difficult, inducing variation in
average products.
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I build and estimate a dynamic investment model similar to those used by Gomes
[2001] and Hennessy and Whited [2007] using Chinese firm level data that matches
the data well. I use this model to assess what fraction of the productivity losses
relative to the world where capital is perfectly allocated, which amount to 59% of
TFP, are generated by the presence of adjustment costs. I find that a third of them
are removed once I take out adjustment costs from the model. I also conduct and
experiment to highlight an amplification channel that the model features where col-
lateral constraints on the amount of debt a firm can issue interact with adjustment
costs. When collateral constraints are tight, high adjustment costs generate much
larger productivity losses than when they are loose, as more unproductive firms
survive.
The second chapter studies the product cycle and it’s relationship to long run
growth. In joint work with Cecilia Fieler we develop a multi-sector growth model
that features the dynamics of the product cycle as described by Gort and Klepper
[1982] and estimate it using historical U.S. data. The structure of the model allows
us to use aggregate data to recover deep parameters that determine the dynamics
of the product cycle. We learn that the typical cycle peaks in 19 years, a magnitude
similar to that measured by Gort and Klepper [1982], and that firms take a long
time to exit. The number of firms that enter and exit during the cycle depend on
the particulars of the innovation and presents large amounts of variation.
2
1 Adjustment Costs, Financial Constraints and
the Persistence of Misallocation in China
1.1 Introduction
In the economics literature, differences in per-capita income across countries have
been historically explained using differences in capital deepening, human capital
and technology levels. Recently a literature has analyzed how these resources are
allocated across different producers within a country and found large differences
of allocative efficiency between developing and developed countries, which implies
aggregate productivity levels far below optimal. Misallocation occurs when the
most productive firms use a small share of the economy’s inputs, and thus operate
at a small scale, while less productive firms control a large share of inputs and
produce a large share of the output. If inputs were reallocated from the least to the
most productive firms, output and measured TFP would rise. Hsieh and Klenow
[2009] provide evidence of substantial efficiency losses in the Chinese manufacturing
sector due to misallocation of productive inputs, in the order of 86% of total factor
productivity (TFP) if it were perfectly allocated, and 40% when compared with the
efficiency of the United States.
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These efficiency losses are typically mapped to distortions in the economy, either
on the input or the product markets that make it difficult for the most productive
firms to grow and capture a large share of the market. Hsieh and Song [2015] find
that in the input side most of these distortions seem to arise from the capital side,
as there is more variation in the average product of capital than in labor in the
Chinese economy.
In this paper I will argue that a large proportion of this variation can be ex-
plained in a model that faces dynamic investment decisions and adjustment costs,
and as such are technological constraints that would be faced by a social planner,
implying that a large proportion of the TFP losses measured in the data should
not necessarily be considered to be policy failures, but as the natural outcome of
an economy where heterogeneous firms that are advancing in their life cycle and
responding optimally to productivity shocks.
Using firm level data on all Chinese publicly traded manufacturing firms in the
years 2000-2013, this paper documents the presence of misallocation within the
companies studied. Given this facts, I build a model of the firm that faces dynamic
investment and financing decisions in the presence of financial constraints and ad-
justment costs, where lenders can potentially treat firms differently according to
their ownership. I will use the firm level data to estimate the structural parameters
of the model. Most recent models of misallocation from the industrial sector are
not able to generate large TFP losses stemming from misallocation [Midrigan and
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Xu, 2014, Gopinath et al.], but this model is able to generate dispersion in TFPR
that is close to the data. I use this framework to explore counterfactual exercises
where I compare the levels of aggregate productivity to the efficient level when the
firms face adjustment costs, and when these are removed. I find that 35% of the
misallocation generated by the model in baseline economy disappears once I remove
convex adjustment costs from the model.
The channel that introduces this dispersion is simple: the level of adjustment
costs that are necessary to match the investment moments in the data induce the
path of capital accumulation to vary more, being more dependent on the particular
history of productivity shocks that a firm faces. When these adjustment costs are
removed, more firms grow faster to their optimal level ending up looking more
alike, reducing the degree of variation in marginal products, the main measure of
misallocation. The key point is that adjustment costs are unavoidable and would
be faced by a social planner.
Finally, I explore how do these adjustment costs interact with financial con-
straints, here modeled as collateral constraints and I establish that adjustment
costs amplify the TFP losses generated through a type of selection: when collateral
constraints are tight and adjustment costs high, more firms are small due to either
exiting when they get a bad shock, or by simply slowing down capital accumulation
enough. When these collateral constraints are loosened, increasing adjustment costs
does not spread out the distribution as much as firms can use debt to grow more
5
quickly.
Related Literature: This paper is a contribution to the growing literature
of misallocation, with early contributions by Restuccia and Rogerson [2008] and
Hsieh and Klenow [2009], and the research of misallocation associated with finan-
cial frictions. Midrigan and Xu [2014], Hsieh and Song [2015], and ? agree in
finding substantial TFP losses due to misallocation in China. Moll [2014] shows
that parametrization choices of models of misallocation can have large results in
the measured aggregate TFP losses. This paper is most closely related to Asker
et al. [2015], who make a similar point in remarking that much of the variation of
average products can be generated by adjustment costs as firms respond optimally
to productivity shocks. This paper provides a model with which the actual aggre-
gate productivity losses can be quantified. Buera and Shin [2013] study the effects
of financial frictions on the persistence of misallocation after reforms that distort
production, and the length of time they take to unwind; suggesting that gradual,
rather than one off reforms must have been the case in developing countries as their
model grows to the steady state too quickly.
This paper is related to the literature of dynamic models of corporate finance,
which Strebulaev and Whited [2012] survey. My model draws from the work of
Gomes [2001], Hennessy and Whited [2007] and Li et al. [2016]. Cooper and Halti-
wanger [2006] make an important contribution highlighting the importance of cap-
ital adjustment costs in being able to match firm investment moments in this liter-
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ature, and they highlight the importance of including both convex and non-convex
costs of adjustment which are not very large, but statistically and economically
significant.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows, Section 1.2 describes the data and
presents the main misallocation results. Section 1.3 describes the model and Sec-
tion 1.4 provides functional forms and gives a brief description of the estimation
procedures. Section 1.5 highlights the results and provides intuition for them, and
finally Section 1.6 gives concluding remarks.
1.2 Misallocation and Adjustment Cost Facts
I have Balance Sheet, Cash Flow, Income Statements, and shareholder information
on all publicly traded firms in China for the period 2000-2013 in the Shanghai and
Shenzhen exchanges from the CSMAR database. To determine the ownership of
each type of firm I follow a methodology similar to Hsieh and Song [2015], where
I code a firm as SOE if: it has more than 50% shares officially listed as state
owned, or if the largest shareholder is the state or a state owned entity. I only keep
manufacturing firms, which leaves me with a sample with 13,608 annual observations
of 1644 firms. As Hsieh and Song [2015] point out, it will be important to also keep
track separately of firms which at one point during the sample were SOE, but have
since been privatized, as these tend to be fall in between SOE and private firms for
most observable characteristics.
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To measure misallocation I will use the framework introduced by Hsieh and
Klenow [2009], which uses unspecified wedges to capture all distortions that drive
the economy away from a perfect allocation of resources. Suppose the economy is
populated by N different sectors, and that in each sector s in period t there are Mts
monopolistically competitive firms each producing differentiated foods ytsi. These
are combined into the aggregate sectoral good Yts with a Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) aggregator with elasticity ν:
Yts =
[
Mts∑
i=1
y
ν−1
ν
tsi
] ν
ν−1
Each firm uses a Cobb-Douglas production function with idiosyncratic produc-
tivity ztsi and labor share 1− αs that is sector specific:
ytsi = ztsik
αs
tsil
1−αs
tsi .
The firm observes demand and chooses prices, capital and labor to maximize
profits pisi:
pitsi = max
ptsi,ktsi,ltsi
ptsi(ytsi)ytsi − (1 + τ ltsi)wltsi − (1 + τ ktsi)(r + δ)ktsi
where p(ysi) = Ps(ysi/Ys)
−1
ν is the usual downward sloping demand curve that
results from consumer optimization under monopolistic competition, τ lsi and τ
k
si are
firm specific wedges that affect the cost of labor and capital respectively. With these
I am trying to capture all possible restrictions, subsidies and any other distortions
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that affect the firm’s marginal product of capital and labor. First order conditions
are the usual, prescribing that the marginal benefits, here titled as marginal revenue
products of labor and capital, equal their marginal costs:
MRPLtsi ≡ (1− αs)
(
ν − 1
ν
)
ptsiytsi
ltsi
= (1 + τ ltsi)w (1.2.1)
MRPKtsi ≡ αs
(
ν − 1
ν
)
ptsiytsi
ktsi
= (1 + τ ktsi)(r + δ) (1.2.2)
Note that the marginal costs include the wedges that prohibit the firm from
reaching its optimal size, as these wedges raise (if there is a distortion), or lower (if
there is a subsidy) marginal costs, rendering firms unable to as optimality prescribes
equalize costs and benefits. A firm that has difficulties in accessing credit, for
example, would have a high τ ktsi, implying that they have a high marginal revenue
product of capital and that it can’t borrow to increase their capital stock. Following
the literature I define a firm’s total factor revenue productivity, TFPRtsi, as:
TFPRtsi ≡ ptsiztsi
A result of consumer optimization is that if there are no distortions present in the
economy, TFPRtsi should be equalized across firms, since every firm faces the same
problem they would choose the same allocations after controlling for productivity.
If you are a very productive firm, which maps to having a high ztsi, you should
capture a large share of the market, which under monopolistic competition leads
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to a lower price ptsi. When TFPRtsi is high relative to other firms, it implies that
the firm is very productive but small, and when it is low, that the firm is large
but unproductive. Thus, if this variable presents a large degree of variation, this is
evidence of abundant misallocation.
To measure TFPRtsi I will use:
TFPRtsi ≡ ptsiztsi = ptsiytsi
kαstsil
1−αs
tsi
, (1.2.3)
Where ptsiytsi will be a measure of value added
1, ktsi will be fixed assets com-
puted with a perpetual inventory method, and ltsi the labor input measured by
cash paid to and on behalf of employees. For this analysis only firms with positive
value added are kept. The sector specific labor shares 1 − αs are computed from
aggregate data and are detailed in Appendix C. In Figure 1.1 I plot the distribution
of log deviations of TFPR from industry means2 by current ownership. Summary
statistics are reported in Table 1.1.
First, the presence of misallocation is clear, as there is wide variation in TFPR
within industries. Second, on average, SOE tend to be larger than their productivity
warrants, with mean deviation of -.048, as they tend to have low TFPR relative
to industry average; while privately owned firms tend to be smaller than their
1Value added will be defined as the sum of Operating Profits (EBIT), cash paid for and on
behalf employees and depreciation.
2The statistic is log(TFPRtsi/TFPRs), where TFPRs is an industry average of TFPRtsi,
defined in Appendix F.
10
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of log(TFPR) Deviations from industry means
Table 1.1: Statistics of TFPR deviations from industry means
N Mean Median S.D. 75 - 25 90 - 10
By Ownership
SOE 6,680 -.048 -.042 .614 .559 1.204
Private 6,052 .096 .105 .624 .643 1.286
By Status
SOE 5,663 -.053 -.040 .594 .549 1.183
Private 4,972 .136 .138 .578 .623 1.240
Privatized SOE 2,097 -.048 -.049 .749 .658 1.430
All Groups
All Years 12,732 .015 .025 .623 .613 1.250
H-K Data 2001 108,702 .68 .88 1.71
H-K Data 2005 211,304 .63 .82 1.59
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of log(TFPRtsi/TFPRs)
over all firms. S.D is standard deviation, 75-25 is the interquartile range
and 90-10 is the difference between the 90th and 10th percentiles. In-
dustries are weighted by share of value added. Only firms with positive
value added are kept.
productivity warrants with mean deviation of .095. A Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test of
whether the distribution for private firms lies below (and hence has more mass on
higher values) than the SOE distribution has a p-value of 2.2 × 10−16. The same
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pattern is observed when I consider Privatized SOE separately, with privatized being
slightly less large for their productivity than SOE, while presenting more variation
of TFPR than both other types of firms.
If I conduct the same counterfactual study as Hsieh and Klenow [2009] of elim-
inating all distortions in the economy I find smaller TFP gains, 19% compared to
86% in their paper. This result is expected, given that they use a survey that covers
all firms above a revenue threshold, and I only observe publicly traded firms, hence
my sample presents much less variation in TFPR than theirs does, as can be seen in
the bottom panel of Table 1.1. The difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles
of TFPR in my data is .613, and for them it is between .82 and .88, and the same
happens with the 90th and 10th percentiles. Furthermore, if I don’t trim the tails
of the distortions and productivity measures, the losses increase to 52%.
To consider the misallocation of capital and labor separately, I plot the stan-
dard deviation of log marginal revenue products of capital and labor separately in
Figure 1.2, which, according to equations (1.2.1)-(1.2.2) should capture the extent
of distortions in these two inputs. If there is significant variation in each one of
these, it would be evidence for distortions of that input, modeled as variation in
the respective wedge. The data points to there being more distortion of capital
than labor, a fact consistent with Hsieh and Song [2015] who document that the
labor productivity of SOE had largely converged with that of the private firms by
2007 while capital productivity in SOE remained smaller. They argue that this
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reflects lower redundant employment in SOE as they shed 3.6 million workers from
1998-2007, while the higher capital productivity of private firms is likely driven by
their difficulty in accessing funding for capital investment. It is interesting to note
that distortions peak around the crisis era, but have since fallen back to pre-crisis
level, potentially an effect of the stimulus policies undertaken during the crisis being
targeted sub-optimally, but having since been undone.
In this paper I will focus on the distortions to capital exclusively, and will not
have any channel that distorts labor choices. Given that it’s typically modeled as
a static choice, I will assume it has been optimized away.
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Figure 1.2: Path of dispersion of log(MRPK) and log(MRPL)
I will now provide some reduced form evidence of the importance of adjustment
costs in amplifying the spread of MRPK in the data. If it is the case that they are
significant, then when a firm receives a productivity shock, this should amplify the
dispersion of marginal products. As output, the numerator of MRPK in equation
(1.2.2) will rise, but the denominator, the capital stock will take a long time to grow
in order to equalize. This is different from the effect of the distortions, as they have
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an effect on the levels of MRPK, rather than a dynamic effect.
To test if this is the case, I will estimate innovations to each firm’s TFPR
process using a dynamic panel model with the methodology of Arellano and Bond
[1991]. The model is:
log(TFPRt+1si) = ρ log(TFPRtsi) + vi +
2013∑
j=2001
γtj + εtsi (1.2.4)
This results in ρˆ = .286. With these estimated innovations εˆtsi I will estimate
the following regression as in Asker et al. [2015]:
log(MRPKtsi) = β0 + β1εˆtsi + β2 log(ktsi) + β3 log(ltsi) + β4 log(TFPRt−1si) + utsi.
(1.2.5)
These regressions ask the following question: faced with the same capital and
lagged productivity levels, do firms who receive different productivity shocks end
up with different marginal products of capital? If adjustment costs were irrelevant,
firms would invest/disinvest optimally and MRPK would remain constant across
firms, rendering β1 = 0. On the other hand, if it takes time to adjust the capital
stock following a shock, a high TFPR innovation today would raise a firm’s marginal
revenue product for a long time, implying β1 > 0. I present the results in Table 1.2.
For all specifications of the regression β1 > 0 at the .01% level, implying that
firms don’t optimally adjust their capital stock immediately after receiving a pro-
ductivity shock, even after controlling for industry and individual productivity, and
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Table 1.2: Dispersion of MRPK and Productivity Shocks
Dependent variable:
log(MRPK)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(TFPR) Innovation 0.467∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.018) (0.023)
Capital Stock −0.600∗∗∗ −0.606∗∗∗ −0.775∗∗∗ −0.933∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.024)
Labor Input 0.623∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.035)
Lagged log(TFPR) 0.158∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.030)
Constant −1.928∗∗∗ −2.074∗∗∗ −0.186∗ 1.530∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.170) (0.108) (0.391)
Year F.E. No Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. No No Yes No
Individual F.E. No No No Yes
Observations 11,122 11,122 11,122 11,122
R2 0.298 0.307 0.834 0.885
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
I report the results of the regression of equation (1.2.5) for different sets of
controls, where the log(TFPR) Innovation is given as the estimated residual
of the model of equation (1.2.4), the Capital Stock is given by fixed assets and
TFPR is defined as in equation (1.2.3). In parentheses are heretoskedasticity
robus standard errors.
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their current input levels. The coefficient implies that a 1% innovation in TFPR
increases the marginal revenue product of capital about .5%, which imply that ad-
justment costs are present in economically and statistically significant amounts. In
Appendix E I add more lags of εˆtsi as a robustness check for timing inconsistencies,
and I find that at both one and two lags of TFPR innovations the coefficient is
positive and significant, providing further evidence that marginal products take a
long time to adjust.
To summarize this section, I have constructed a measure of misallocation in
China that agrees with the results of Hsieh and Klenow [2009], where there is
present a large degree of variation of marginal products, mostly of capital. I thus
conduct a reduced form exercise to test whether adjustment costs could be a plau-
sible explanation of this variation, and I find that they must be present in order to
justify the dynamic decisions of firms in the data.
1.3 Model
This section presents the model used to study the investment decisions of firms,
and I highlight the sources of variation of marginal products implied by it. The
model follows closely a modified version of Li et al. [2016], which is a dynamic
investment model with a contracting problem, but I add an exit decision modeled
as in Clementi and Palazzo [2015], with monopolistic competition.
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers making differ-
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entiated goods yt, whose objective is to maximize the expected value of the firm.
Within the continuum of firms, there will be three types, denoted i ∈ {a, b, c},
respectively private, privatized and SOE firms. For clarity any parameters that
depend on the type of the firm will have an i index. Each firm enters a period with
a productivity shock z ∈ Z, debt b ∈ B and capital k ∈ K, where K×B×Z ⊂ R3.
The firm faces a demand curve given by p(y) = y−1/ν . Once it enters the period
the firm produces using its capital stock according and the technological shock,
which follows a Markov process with transition function Qi(dz′, z) which satisfies
the Feller property. Firm output is given by the production function F :
y(k, z, i) = F (k, z, i)
Operating profits are given by
pi(k, z, i) = p (y(k, z, i)) y(k, z, i)
After production, the firm chooses whether to pay a random fixed cost cf with
distribution function Cif to continue operating. If it chooses to exit, then it pays
off its debts (1 + rb)b and returns to shareholders the produced output and the
depreciated value of capital. If the firm decides to pay the fixed cost, it must
choose how much capital to have next period k′ and how much to borrow b′ at rate
1 + r from a deep pockets bank, subject to a collateral constraint:
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(1 + r)b′ ≤ θi(1− δ)k′
Li et al. [2016] derive this constraint as a reformulation of an enforcement con-
straint on a long term debt contract, but restrict equity distributions to be positive.
The firm discounts with β, pays adjustment costs of capital according to the func-
tion Ai(k, k′), and if it issues negative distributions, it must pay equity issuance
costs which are captured in the function Φi(·). The capital and borrowing decisions
imply how large are equity distributions e, to be defined below.
1.3.1 Recursive Problem
The recursive problem for a firm with type i can be written down as follows:
V (k, b, z, i) =
∫
cf
max
exit,operate
{
V E(k, b, z, i), V O(k, b, z, i)− cf
}
dCi(cf ) (1.3.1)
The value of exiting is distributing profits and depreciated capital net of debts:
V E(k, b, z, i) = pi(k, z, i) + (1− δ)k − (1 + r)b. (1.3.2)
The value of operation after paying the fixed cost is given by:
V O(k, b, z, i) = max
k′,b′
Φi(e(k, k′, b, b′, z, i)) + β
∫
z′
V (k′, b′, z′, i)Qi(dz′, z) (1.3.3)
equity distributions are given by:
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e(k, k′, b, b′, z, i) = pi(k, z, i) + (1− δ)k − (1 + r)b− k′ − Ai(k, k′) + b′ (1.3.4)
subject to
(1 + r)b′ ≤ θi(1− δ)k′ (1.3.5)
The equity issuance costs function Φi charges a constant fraction φi of the raised
value, paid only if distributions are negative:
Φi(e) = e+ 1[e<0]φ
ie. (1.3.6)
Since the fixed cost enters linearly, the exit decision is given by a cutoff rule
where there exists a realization of the fixed cost c∗f (k, b, z, i) that renders the firm
indifferent between exiting and staying, and thus the firm will exit with probability
P[cf ≥ c∗f (k, b, z, i)] = xi(k, b, z), and stay with complementary probability. By a
law of large numbers, at each state the measure of firms that choose to stay will
pay an expected fixed cost of
E[cf |cf ≤ c∗f (k, b, z, i)] ≡ cef (k, b, z, i)
The solution to this problem is given by policies k′(k, b, z, i), xi(k, b, z), b′(k, b, z, i),
e(k, b, z, i) and a value function V (k, b, z, i). We can rewrite the value function as:
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V (k, b, z, i) = xi(k, b, z)V E(k, b, z) + (1− xi(k, b, z))[V O(k, b, z, i)− cef (k, b, z, i)]
1.3.2 Aggregation
Firms are born with initial capital endowment ki0 and zero debt, and a shock drawn
from the stationary distribution of Qi(dz′, z), denoted as Q
i
(dz). Any firm that
exits is replaced with a newborn firm. Let µi(k, b, z) denote the mass of firms in the
state (k, b, z) ∈ K×B ×Z, for any for any subset S = (K,B,Z) ∈ Σ(K)×Σ(B)×
Σ(Z), where Σ(X) denotes the minimum sigma algebra for set X. For compactness
denote s = (k, b, z). The law of motion for the measure of firms of type i can be
characterized in the following way, for the sets that contain the state at which firms
are born, if (ki0, 0) ∈ (K,B)
µ
′i(S) =
∫
K
∫
B
∫
Z
∫
Z
χi(s, S)
[
µi(ds)(1− xi(s))]Qi(dz′, z) + ∫
Z
M iQ
i
(dz) (1.3.7)
for cases when it is not, (ki0, 0) /∈ (K,B)
µ
′i(S) =
∫
K
∫
B
∫
Z
∫
Z
χi(s, S)
[
µi(ds)(1− xi(s))]Qi(dz′, z). (1.3.8)
Where χi is an indicator function of whether the policy functions points to a
specific state:
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χi(s, S) =

1 if (k′(s, i), b′(s, i)) ∈ (K,B)
0 otherwise
(1.3.9)
and M i is the mass of exitors, whom are just reborn at initial capital and zero
debt:
M i =
∫
K
∫
Q
∫
Z
xi(s)µi(ds) (1.3.10)
This equation takes into account the exit, investment and borrowing decisions of
firms to keep track of the state of each firm of type i across the whole distribution.
To obtain the aggregate measure µ, add the three measures together
∑
i,s µ
i(s) =
µ(s).
Since the equilibrium definition will be a stationary industry equilibrium, it will
be the case that µ′ = µ = µ∗ so that µ defines the mass of firms in a stationary
equilibrium.
Using this stationary distribution, I can define aggregate variables in the follow-
ing way, aggregate debt is given by
B =
∑
i∈{a,b,c}
∫
S
bµi(ds) (1.3.11)
aggregate capital,
K =
∑
i∈{a,b,c}
∫
S
kµi(ds) (1.3.12)
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aggregate output,
Y =
 ∑
i∈{a,b,c}
∫
S
y(k, z, i)
ν−1
ν µi(ds)
 νν−1 , (1.3.13)
aggregate TFP will be measured as
TFP ≡ Y
K
=
TFPR
P
=
[ ∑
i=a,b,c
∫
S
(
z
TFPR
TFPR(s, i)
)ν−1
µi(s)
] 1
ν−1
(1.3.14)
where TFPR ≡ PY/K is aggregate revenue productivity and TFPR(s, i) =
p(y(s, i))z is defined as in the data section. Finally, given that efficient allocation
of resources is achieved when all firms equalize TFPR(s, i) = TFPR, so that if
capital is perfectly allocated, the efficient level of TFP is
TFP e =
[ ∑
i=a,b,c
∫
S
zν−1µi(s)
]1/(ν−1)
. (1.3.15)
These equations are derived in Appendix G.
1.3.3 Stationary Industry Equilibrium
Definition 1. : A stationary industry equilibrium is a set of policies for each type
of firm k′(k, b, z, i), b′(k, b, z, i), xi(k, b, z), a value function V (k, b, z, i) and three
firm measures µ = (µa, µb, µc) such that
• Firm decision rules and value function solve each firm’s problem (1.3.1)-
(1.3.6);
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• The measures µ satisfy the law of motion (1.3.7)-(1.3.10) with µ′ = µ.
Proposition 1. There exists a stationary industry equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B
1.3.4 Sources of Misallocation
To clarify what are the sources of misallocation in the model, I will describe the
optimality condition with respect to capital. Suppose that the Lagrange multiplier
of the collateral constraint is λβ, and denote δh as the partial derivative with respect
to h, and I omit the arguments of the policy functions. The first order condition of
next period capital, k′, in the case of positive distributions (for simplicity), is given
by
1 + δk′A
i(k, k′) = βEz′ [δk′V (k′, b′, z′, i) + λθi(1− δ)|z]
1 + δk′A
i(k, k′) = βEz′
[
αi
(
ν − 1
ν
)
p(z′k′α
i
)z′k′α
i−1 + (1− δ)
+ X(k′, b′, z′, i) + λθi(1− δ)|z]
Rearranging the discounting and depreciation terms,
1 + δk′A
i(k, k′)
β
+ δ − 1 = Ez′
[
αi
(
ν − 1
ν
)
p′y′
k′
+X(k′, b′, z′, i)|z
]
+ λθi(1− δ)
1 + δk′A
i(k, k′)
β
+ δ − 1 = Ez′ [MRPK ′ +X(k′, b′, z′, i)|z] + λθi(1− δ)
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The left hand side of this equation is the user cost of capital, and the right hand
side is marginal revenue product of capital, plus the shadow value of relaxing the
collateral constraint. The term X(k′, b′, z′, i) captures the marginal returns related
with the exit decision and adjustment costs:
X(k′, b′, z′, i) = δk′xi(·)[k′′ + Ai(k′, k′′)− b′ + 1[e<0]φie′ + cef − βV ′′]
+ xi(·)[δk′Ai(k′, k′′) + 1[e<0]φi + δk′cef ]
In the model variation in the measured marginal revenue product of capital
MRPK, which is defined here identically as for the data analysis in equation (1.2.2),
is generated by variation of the adjustment costs firms are facing, equity issuance
costs and the exit decision through the X term, risks in investment, and the collat-
eral constraint, which affects the choice of capital at its shadow value λ. Implicit
in this equation is also the initial level of capital ki0, which can be interpreted as
IPO size of the firm, which affects where along distribution of marginal products of
capital the firms are located in the stationary distribution.
The two effects that this paper wants to highlight are the contribution of ad-
justment costs to generating dispersion in MRPK through X and the time-to-build
technology that requires that capital purchased today to be productive tomorrow.
I will also study how do collateral constraints (θi) and adjustment costs interact to
make the growth process slower, and the TFP losses from misallocation larger.
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1.4 Estimation and Identification
Now that the equilibrium has been defined, this section describes the functional
forms chosen for the model, the estimation procedure and the identification of pa-
rameters.
1.4.1 Functional Forms
For the firms, I will assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, where the capital
share will be the same for al types of firms:
F (z, k, l) = zkα
i
The stochastic process for the technology shock is given by
log(z′) = (1− ρi)miz + ρi log(z) + σiz
where  ∼ N(0, 1). This process allows for firms of different ownership types to
have productivity with different means, variances and persistence levels. The distri-
bution of the random fixed costs Cif will be lognormal with parameters (m
i
cf
, σi2cf ).
The functional form of adjustment costs of capital feature fixed and convex costs, as
is typical in the investment literature, and is key to fitting the investment moments
in the data (see ?Cooper and Haltiwanger [2006]),
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Ai(k, k′) = 1[k′ 6=k]κi0k +
κi1k
2
(
k′ − (1− δ)k
k
)2
.
1.4.2 Method of Simulated Moments & Identification
I will estimate most of the structural parameters of the model using the method
of simulated moments (MSM), however some of the parameters will have to be
estimated separately or fixed from outside data. The discount factor is set to the
average real 1-year lending rate in China for 2000-2013, which was 5.6%, so that
β = 1
1.056
. As is typical of the investment literature, in order for the firm’s problem
to be well defined even in the long run, it is required that β < 1
1+r
, basically to
render the firm less patient than it’s lenders. This is typically achieved if taxes
are included in the model, but since I don’t explicitly model taxes, and this gap
is very difficult to identify in the data, I will use the corporate tax rate of 25% to
set r = (1 − .25) × 0.056 = 0.042.3 This rate implies that agents don’t have an
incentive to pay down their debts once they reach their optimal size, and thus are
either newborn with zero debt, or at their constraints at all times.
The depreciation rate is set at δ = .09 to match the ratio of depreciation to
fixed assets in the data. The elasticity of substitution is ν = 3 to match the TFPR
analysis of Section 1.2. The means of the stochastic processes for the technol-
3Given that if the firm borrows one dollar and pays r of interest on it, they get to deduct r
dollars from their taxable income, which pays rate tax, this renders the effective interest rate as
(1− tax)× r.
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ogy shock are estimated using the method of Wooldridge [2009], which is a GMM
refinement of Olley and Pakes [1996]. I average the resulting log productivity mea-
sures across firm types, and express them as ratios to SOE log productivity so that
mcz = log(1), private firms productivity is m
a
z = log(2.2) and privatized productivity
is mbz = log(1.2). Given that I can’t identify in my data if a firm is delisted, closes
or is taken private, I will take the exit rates from the aggregate data of Hsieh and
Song [2015], where the average exit rate from 1998-2007 was 12% for private firms
and 13.2% for SOE. For privatized firms I’ll take the average of these two.
The parameters that I will estimate are p = ({ρi, σiz, θi, ωi, ki0, κi0, κi1, αi}i∈{a,b,c}),
where ωi stands for the ratio of the absolute value of the mean to the standard
deviation of the fixed cost. I will express ki0 as a percentage of the non-stochastic
steady state level of capital. Given that the exit rate and equity issuance rates
are almost uniquely dependent and monotone on the mean of the fixed cost micf
and the equity issuance cost parameter φi respectively, I will for every solution of
the model at parameters p use a bisection algorithm over these two to match the
two moments very closely. The relative mass of each type of firm will be given by
the share of aggregate output each produced within the sample, so that aggregate
quantities match the relative contributions of each type. This results in SOE being
66%, Private firms 23% and Privatized SOE 11%.
The idea of MSM is to estimate the parameters of an average firm by choosing
them so that the average moments that result from a simulation are close to those
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from the data. In a model where the stationary distribution of firms is obtained,
I can avoid simulation error by computing population moments in the model by
using the distribution and policy functions of the firms.
I will match the mean and standard deviation of equity issuance, and the fraction
of periods with positive issuance4. I will also match the mean, standard deviation
and AR(1) coefficients of investment, operating profits and debt, where debt is
defined as the sum of short term debt, long term debt and bonds outstanding. All
moments will be measured relative to fixed assets, as the model does not include
any investment in intangibles or working capital. My model counterparts will be
(k′−(1−δ)k)/k for investment, b/k for debt, profits will be pi/k, and equity issuance
will be 1[e<0]e/k.
In MSM identification comes from carefully choosing moments that are sensitive
to the structural parameters of the model. A parameter is well identified by the
MSM estimator if it has a monotonic relationship with a data moment [Strebulaev
and Whited, 2012]. It is also important that the moments are related to the variables
that will be affected in the counterfactual. In my model, the standard deviation
and autocorrelation of profits are most informative about ρi and σiz. A higher
collateral constraint parameter θi corresponds to larger levels of mean debt while
the correlation of debt and investment is useful for placing debt within the pecking
order of sources of financing, mostly through ki0.
4This frequency is normalized by the number of periods a firm is in the sample.
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Mean investment and equity issuance depend on the cost parameter φi and
the initial level of capital ki0. The standard deviation of investment informs the
curvature of the production function αi as firms won’t invest as aggressively as a
result of a productivity shock if the firm presents large decreasing returns to scale.
The adjustment costs parameters, κi0 and κ
i
1 are related to the standard deviation
of investment and to its autocorrelation. The computational method to solve the
model and technical details about how I solve the model and on MSM are given in
Appendix A.
1.5 Results
In Table 1.4 I present the data and simulated moments that resulted from the
estimation. The model does fairly well at matching the data. The moments that
are the most important for the counterfactuals to be studied, those relating to
investment, are well captured, as the mean, standard deviation and autocorrelation
of investment moments are very close to the data. The profit moments, which
relate to production are also well captured, as also is the debt level. The model
has difficulty achieving equity issuance levels that match the data and at the same
time reasonable profitability and investment levels, which occurs because the firms
would be on average smaller when equity issuance is high, inducing the ratios of
investment and profits to assets to be much larger. Given that those moments are
better measured in the data (the variance-covariance matrix from which the weights
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are derived presents a much smaller variance for mean investment and profits), the
estimator prefers to match these two over equity issuance.
Table 1.3: Parameter Estimates
Type θi ρi σiz ω
i ki0 κ
i
0 κ
i
1 α
i χ2
Private 0.637 0.834 0.387 23.786 0.004 0.000 1.811 0.976 5.366
SOE 0.731 0.875 0.465 17.899 0.014 0.033 2.031 0.971 4.314
Privatized 0.838 0.861 0.477 12.129 0.026 0.023 1.264 0.959 5.274
Notes: The table reports the parameter values estimated with Method of Simulated
Moments. χ2 is the statistic for the J test of overidentifying restrictions. The 95th
percentile of the distribution is 11.07.
Table 1.3 contains the point estimates of parameter values that result from the
estimation. The debt to capital ratios are monotonic in the debt levels that they
match, a typical feature of models with collateral constraints. Private firms start
smaller than SOE, which in turn start smaller than privatized firms, inducing the
patterns in equity issuance observed in the data, but at much smaller scales given
the difficulties discussed before.
The model is fit well, as can be evidenced by the results of the J-test of over
identifying restrictions, given by the last column of Table 1.3, where the test statis-
tics for all three estimations are well to the left of the 95th quantile, failing to reject
the null hypothesis that the model is not identified. Some non-targeted moments
that the model also fits well are the time series moments of productivity, ρi and
σiz, which are very close to those that arise from the previously estimated produc-
tivity measures using the same dynamic panel regression as in equation (1.2.4). In
the data, the autocorrelation coefficient has a value of .801, with standard error of
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the regression of .511, which are close to the values found across the firm types in
Table 1.3.
Finally, to assess how closely the model captures measured misallocation relative
to the data, it is useful to compare the variation in log(TFPR) from Table 1.1, and
the aggregate results from the baseline parametrization in Table 1.5. The standard
deviation was .62 while in the model it was .47, therefore the model does not
generate the same degree of variation, and it can be seen that it is due to the
model not having that many firms in the tails, as the log difference of 90th and
10th quantiles is 1.05, while in the data it was 1.25, yet the gap between the 75th
and the 25th quantiles are very close. Given that the model is very parsimonious
in how distortions from optimality are generated, this is to be expected.
The model is able to generate TFP losses relative to the efficient allocation of
resources of 59%, in the range of those found by Hsieh and Klenow [2009] who
determine they are 86%, much larger than those from the data used in this paper,
which were only 19%, again, mostly due to a much smaller sample of more homoge-
neous firms.5 In the next counterfactual, I explore the contribution of the presence
of adjustment costs to this large degree of inefficiencies.
5This low number is also due to following the same trimming procedure of Hsieh and Klenow
[2009], where as if I don’t trim the 1% tails of TFPR and the distortions, the TFP losses relative to
the efficient are 52%, implying that the tails of this distribution are very important in determining
the degree of misallocation generated.
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In order to clarify the effects of capital deepening and selection in the model, the
fourth column of Table 1.5 shows the aggregate effects of greatly relaxing financial
constraints, by increasing the collateral constraint parameter of all types of firms
to θi = 2. The main thing to notice is that measured TFP falls by 22%, which
is the result of two forces: first, given that the production function of the firms
presents decreasing returns to scale, and TFP is defined as Y/K, keeping other
things constant, increasing the scale of the economy will lower the average marginal
productivity, which is captured as lower TFP. Thus, while output is greatly in-
creased, the quantity of capital required to produce it is more than proportionally
larger, and measured TFP falls. Second, the average physical productivity of the
surviving firms falls, as looser financial constraints allows more small and low pro-
ductivity firms to survive. Due to this selection effect, the different distributions
give different levels of efficient TFP, TFP e in equation (1.3.15), so for the rest of the
paper I’ll present both TFP losses relative to the baseline, and to the counterfactual
efficient levels of TFP.
1.5.1 Counterfactuals
In this subsection I present the results of my counterfactual exercises. For all of these
only the parameters detailed are changed, so there is no new bisection performed,
as can be seen by the changes in exit rates, an important channel through which
adjustment costs and financial constraints interact to affect TFP losses.
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Table 1.5: Aggregate Results
Data Baseline θi = 2
Aggregate TFP 2.41 1.87
TFP Losses 19% 59% 85%
TFP Losses To Baseline 59% 106%
Output (Y ) 763 1946
Capital (K) 315 1040
Debt (B) 192 1806
SD log(TFPR) .62 .47 .58
75-25 log(TFPR) .61 .60 .62
90-10 log(TFPR) 1.25 1.05 1.41
Exit Rate 12% 13% 6%
The table contains the aggregate variables of the
economy, computed as in equations (1.3.11)-(1.3.15).
The first column names the aggregate moments,
the second column contains the relevant moments
from the data, the third column has the baseline
parametrization and the fourth column contains a
counterfactual there the collateral constraint param-
eter is set for all firms at θi = 2. The TFP losses are
measured as 100(TFP e/TFP − 1), where TFP e can
be either the model’s, or the one from the baseline
economy and represent how much TFP would rise if
it were perfectly allocated. 75-25 and 90-10 stand for
the difference of the quantiles of the stationary dis-
tribution of log(TFPR).
The counterfactual exercise of Table 1.6 removes the adjustment costs by setting
either κi0 = 0, κ
i
1 = 0, or both, and presents the same aggregate values, divided
by those of the baseline economy for clarity. From the second column it can be
seen that removing fixed adjustment costs is able to both increase the scale of
the economy and marginally increase TFP, and from the third column, removing
convex adjustment costs increased TFP by 10% and brought the economy much
closer to the efficient level, by 20 percentage points. When both are removed TFP
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increases by only 6%, and this case is the one that minimizes variation of TFPR
at .34, approximately half of the variation in the data. However, removing fixed
adjustment costs makes it easier for SOE and privatized firms to capture a larger
share of the market, and because these are the least productive types of firms,
aggregate productivity falls.
This key result implies that for this model to generate sizable TFP losses relative
to an efficient TFP level, it requires a technological constraint would also be en-
countered by a social planner, and has been established to be necessary in order to
accurately capture the timing of investment decisions found in the data, and thus is
unavoidable. This implies that a large proportion of the measured misallocation by
the literature may not be caused by bad policies, but is an inherent part of the firm
life cycle as they respond to productivity shocks along their capital accumulation
process.
Note that the increase in output is fivefold, and it occurs because without these
adjustment costs, the firms optimally choose to grow very quickly, and are at their
optimal size in one period by issuing large amounts of equity. Deviations of opti-
mality only occur when the productivity shock changes, or when they exit because
they received a large fixed cost shock. Thus, these firms spend most of the time
in their optimal size, rather than being distributed along the path to it as in the
baseline, and this distribution produces much more output. This fact is robust to
lager values of the equity issuance costs.
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In order to study the interaction of adjustment costs and financial constraints
I first present in Table 1.7 the aggregate results of equalizing collateral parameters
θi and initial capital levels ki0 at their value added weighted means. I map k
i
0 to
IPO size and can be thought of as a financial parameter. In the data SOE firms
have a mean log assets in their first year of being listed of 21.01, while private of
20.75, so the estimated differences of ki0 are broadly in line with the data . As can
be seen in this table equalizing these constraints does not increase TFP by a large
amount, just about 2%. However, this process improves selection as the TFP losses
relative to the baseline efficient TFP are smaller than those of the counterfactual
efficient TFP, indicating that the surviving firms are on average more productive
when θi is equalized. Thus, in the presence of adjustment costs, the misallocation
due to different financial treatment across firm types are about 20% of those that
arise from adjustment costs.
In Table 1.8 I compare the interaction of the collateral constraints and adjust-
ment costs channels by comparing how much do TFP losses increase as the level of
adjustment costs increases for tight financial constraints (θi = .5), and loose finan-
cial constraints (θi = 1). I solve the model after I set the level of adjustment costs
low: 10% of the baseline adjustment costs parameters, medium at 50% and high at
200% of the adjustment costs levels.
The effects of relaxing collateral constraints are consistent with the capital deep-
ening and decreasing returns to scale technology, as discussed in the beginning of
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Table 1.7: Counterfactual: Equalizing Financial Constraints
(Relative to Baseline)
Baseline θi = .72 ki0 = .01 Both
Aggregate TFP 1 1.02 1.01 1.02
TFP Losses 59% 58% 56% 59%
TFP Losses to Baseline 59% 55% 57% 56%
Output (Y ) 1 .74 1.02 .96
Capital (K) 1 .72 1.01 .94
Debt (B) 1 .61 1 .92
SD log(TFPR) .47 .49 .44 .47
Exit Rate 13% 15% 12% 15%
The table contains results of counterfactual exercises, with the ag-
gregate variables computed as in equations (1.3.11)-(1.3.15). The
first column names the aggregate moments, all of which will be
expressed a ratio to the baseline economy. The second, third
and fourth columns contain the aggregate quantities that result
from equalizing θi = .72, ki0 = .01, and from equalizing both
simultaneously respectively. The TFP losses are measured as
100(TFP e/TFP − 1), where TFP e can be either the model’s, or
the one from the baseline economy and represent how much TFP
would rise if it were perfectly allocated. 75-25 and 90-10 stand
for the difference of the quantiles of the stationary distribution of
log(TFPR).
this section: for all levels of adjustment costs, relaxing financial constraints reduces
aggregate TFP as a result of firms operating at a larger scale with decreasing re-
turns to scale technology. What’s important to highlight is how these magnitudes
differ at different levels of collateral constraints.
If collateral constraints are tight, increasing the level of adjustment costs in-
creases the TFP losses by 20 percentage points, whereas doing the same for loose
financial constraints increases TFP losses by the smaller amount of 13 percentage
points. The main channel is the fattening of the right tail: when financial con-
straints are tight and adjustment costs high, more firms exit relatively early and
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are born with a small level of capital, which is associated with high TFPR: the 90th
quantile is .60 when constraints are tight and .53 when they are loose. In contrast,
when financial constraints are loose, more of these firms survive, and bring aggre-
gate TFP down. Thus, adjustment costs and collateral constraints interact to make
the losses from misallocation larger: when constraints are tight, higher adjustment
costs make the size distribution of firms more spread out as firms are kept small,
yet if these are loose, occurs happens much faster.
Table 1.8: Counterfactual: Adjustment Costs Experiment (Relative
to Baseline)
θ = .5 θ = 1
Low Mid High Low Mid High
Aggregate TFP 1.09 1.04 1.00 1.01 1.01 .97
TFP Losses 43% 55% 63% 52% 61% 65%
TFP Losses to Baseline 46% 52% 59% 58% 60% 64%
Output (Y ) 2.55 1.37 .51 2.60 1.77 .48
Capital (K) 2.38 1.31 .51 2.57 1.79 .50
Debt (B) 1.64 .90 .31 3.64 2.50 .64
SD log(TFPR) .40 .47 .53 .42 .49 .52
10th Q TFPR .15 .14 .21 .14 .15 .22
25th Q TFPR .21 .21 .22 .19 .19 .22
50th Q TFPR .24 .27 .37 .22 .22 .30
75th Q TFPR .28 .38 .48 .27 .34 .49
90th Q TFPR .38 .45 .60 .37 .45 .53
Exit Rate 11% 13% 18% 12% 12% 16%
The table contains results of counterfactual exercises, with the ag-
gregate variables computed as in equations (1.3.11)-(1.3.15). The
first column names the aggregate moments, all of which will be ex-
pressed a ratio to the baseline economy, as well as the 10th, 25th ,
50th 75th and 90th quantiles of the distribution of TFPR. The sec-
ond to seventh columns display these moments for different values
of adjustment costs, which vary from Low (10% of each model’s ad-
justment costs in the baseline estimation), Medium (50%) and High
(200%), and the level of financial constraints.
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1.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I study misallocation within the context of a dynamic investment
model in order to measure how important are adjustment costs to misallocation as
is measured by the variation in marginal products, the most common measure of
the literature. I find that my small sample presents a large degree of variation in
these marginal products and that TFP losses from misallocation are large, similarly
to studies done with a larger sample.
I build and estimate a dynamic investment model of a firm that faces adjustment
costs and financial constraints using Chinese data and the method of simulated
moments. This model is able to generate variation in marginal products and TFP
losses from misallocation that are in the order of what was measured in the data.
Using the model I conduct several counterfactual exercises to examine if adjust-
ment costs are a big source of the TFP losses found. To do this I remove adjustment
costs from the model and conclude that 35% of the losses arise due to the presence of
adjustment costs, while a negligible amount arises from financial constraints. This
result provides evidence that much of the measured TFP losses may be unavoidable
by a social planner, and thus efficient. Finally, I study how financial constraints
and adjustment costs interact to worsen the allocation of resources, which occurs
through both a selection effect (more unproductive firms survive), and a capital
deepening effect.
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2 Growth and Product Cycle
2.1 Introduction
Economic growth in the XX century America is marked by the arrival of large
innovations—e.g., synthetic fiber and rubber in the early decades, cars and assem-
bly lines in the 1920s, household appliances in the 1940s and 1950s, and personal
computers in the later decades.6 Gort and Klepper [1982] document empirical reg-
ularities following large successful innovations. Initially, new firms enter, varieties
are created, and production processes and product features improve significantly.
In a maturing stage, firms settle on preferred processes and product features, the
number of firms stabilizes and innovation slows down. Eventually, the arrival of a
new innovation drive entrepreneurs and labor out of the sector.
We develop a quantitative growth model with multiple sectors and overlapping
generations of types of products that captures this process of Schumpeterian creative
destruction. Consumers have nested CES preferences over goods that are classified
into types, that are themselves classified into sectors. A product type corresponds
to a nest and each firm produces one variety. The arrival of a new type is followed
6Harberger [1998]
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by endogenous entry of firms because new types are on average more productive
than old ones, and by exogenous within-type productivity growth. The expansion
of new types drives down the economy’s price index, thereby inducing exit from old
types. Because the quality of each type is stochastic, growth is heterogeneous across
sectors. If the number of sectors is small, then growth also varies across decades. If
it is large, growth is balanced and the model has a closed form solution.
In sum, the tension between disruptive new types and imitators give rise to the
entry and exit of firms in and out of sectors that render the model uniquely suited to
analyze product cycles in aggregate data. We use data from the Historical Statistics
of the United States on value added, number of workers, and number of establish-
ment classified into 20 sectors over the period of 1899 through 1999. Growth is
highly heterogeneous across sectors. In a typical decade the fastest growing sector
grows at an annualized rate 4.6 percentage points faster than the median sector,
and the slowest growing sectors experience negative growth. Relative to other sec-
tors, fast-growing sectors grow in number of employees (not surprisingly), number
of firms and number of employees per firm.
While these facts suggest the presence of Schumpeterian product cycles, we do
not directly observe innovations. For example, the sector “electrical equipment and
supplies” grew disproportionately in the 1950s, but we do not observe household
appliances within the sector. We estimate the model using the method of simulated
moments. The estimation uses moments from the data together with the struc-
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ture of the model to infer characteristics of the product cycle. For example, the
correlation of growth rates within sectors, across decades provide information on
the average duration of different stages of the product cycle. If cycles were short
lived, then this correlation would be low because new innovations would quickly
drive out old ones. Figure 2.13 illustrates a typical product cycle in the model. The
cycle peaks after 19 years from the first entry. This estimated duration is broadly
consistent with Gort and Klepper. Using data on firm entry and exit for 46 large
innovations in the United States, they find that the product cycle appears in pre-
dictable stages for all of these products, with different durations. On average, the
typical innovation has a period of fast entry and then a shake out where many firms
exit, and these stages last 22 years. Comin and Hobijn [2004] study technologi-
cal adoption across countries and find that innovations disseminate in predictable
patterns in this dimension as well.
This result shows that our estimation strategy is reasonably successful in ex-
tracting from aggregate data unobservable features of product cycles. Relative to
Gort and Klepper, the approach relies on stronger structural assumptions, but it
allows us to analyze the universe of manufacturing firms in the United States, and
data on value added and number of workers per establishment, not just the number
of firms. Our estimates imply a large variation in the number of establishments and
value added across cycles. The ratio of the peak number of firms in the median
cycle to the 90th percentile largest cycle is four and the 90th percentile the sector
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has over double the market share of the median.
The features of the data highlighted above are not captured by existing models.
Schumpeterian growth models pioneered by Grossman and Helpman [1991], Aghion
and Howitt [1992] and more recently extended by Klette and Kortum [2004], Akcigit
and Kerr [2010] and Acemoglu et al. [2013] typically feature only one firm per
product line. Arkolakis et al. [2014] model rich firm dynamics but do not have a
notion of sectors or disruptive innovation. Jovanovic and MacDonald [1994], Gort
and Klepper [1982], Klepper [1996] model the dynamics of a single product cycle,
but do not have aggregate economic growth or the arrival of new innovations. The
paper is also related to vintage models such as Cooley et al. [1997] and Greenwood
and Jovanovic [2001]. These papers study movements of investment and capital
across sectors, not movements of firms.
Our paper complements this previous work by analyzing new aspects of the
data, at the cost of simplifying features of other models. Most critically, new types
arrive exogenously and deterministically, one per sector and per decade.
The paper is organized as follows, section 2.2 describes the data set and describes
the variables we construct, section 2.3 describes in more detail the stylized facts
we uncover from this data, section 2.4 develops our model, section 2.6 describes
the estimation procedure, section 2.7 presents our results and section 2.8 provides
concluding remarks.
44
2.2 Description of the dataset
The dataset we use is the Historical Statistics of the United States: Millenial Edi-
tion. In particular we use Series Dd-13-231 which include the detailed Manufactur-
ing data for 1899-1999. From this dataset we collect value added, number of estab-
lishments and number of employees for 20 manufacturing sectors according the the
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. We deflate value added values us-
ing the Minneapolis Federal Reserve’s Consumer Price Index dataset, which covers
1800-2015.
We study growth over decades to overcome missing data and to focus on long
run growth. We average the observations one year before, during and after the start
of a decade, and refer to this as the decade’s value.7 To compute growth rates we
use percentage change formulas over these.
The results are 154 data points of value added levels, 157 data points of number
of establishments and 140 data points of number of employees. Four sectors only
begin reporting after the 1940s, and we have only 5 decade observations, but for
thirteen of them we are able to assemble the full data of 9 decades from 1900-1980.
7For example, to construct the value added by the Food and Kindred Products we average the
values for 1899, 1900 and 1901.
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2.3 Stylized Facts
In this section we describe the main stylized facts we uncover with this data set,
focusing on the relationships between growth and market shares of value added,
employment and number of establishments across and within decades. In table 2.1
we present the sectors and their average annualized8 growth rates of value added,
number of establishments and employment. The sectors that grew the fastest in
value added, Electrical Equipment and Supplies (electrical), Instruments and Re-
lated Products (instruments), Petroleum and Coal Products (petroleum), Rubber
and Plastics Products (rubber) and Transportation Equipment (transportation) co-
incide with the qualitative evidence of having experienced large innovations during
the 20th Century.
The table also suggests that sectors that high growth rates of value added also
experienced high growth in both the number of establishments and employees. In
order to assess this, we construct table 2.2 where we compute the correlations with
value added growth of these variables. Growth in value added is highly correlated
with growth in number of establishments and employment. The contemporaneous
correlation between growth in value added and in number of employees is 0.83,
and between growth in value added and number of establishments is 0.61. The
relationships, displayed as a scatterplot on figure 2.19, are well approximated by
8We annualize by raising the decate growth rate to the power of 110 for convenience, and
explicitly denote where we use these transformed rates.
9In graph (b) we exclude the growth of rubber establishments in the 1950s as it is a large outlier
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Table 2.1: Annualized Average Growth Rates
sector Value Added Establishments Employment
apparel 1.025 1.009 1.011
chemicals 1.044 1.005 1.018
electrical 1.063 1.040 1.049
fabricatedmetal 1.051 1.034 1.017
food 1.035 0.988 1.004
furniture 1.032 1.015 1.016
instruments 1.056 1.026 1.032
leather 1.011 0.992 0.996
lumber 1.018 1.003 0.997
machinery 1.055 1.047 1.018
miscellaneous 1.019 1.003 0.996
paper 1.043 1.015 1.019
petroleum 1.053 1.024 1.017
primarymetal 1.035 1.019 1.000
printing 1.033 1.009 1.019
rubber 1.050 1.048 1.036
stone 1.031 1.006 1.010
textile 1.018 1.002 1.001
tobacco 1.023 0.947 0.988
transportation 1.053 1.041 1.012
a line. A similar pattern holds for levels in figure 2.3, where we plot the sectoral
shares of value added, employment and establishments. Given that we have some
decades with missing observations, the shares are normalized by multiplying by the
number of sectors that have data. This is equivalent to dividing by the decade mean
value added, rather that the sum of value added. Sectors with high value added
have higher employment and number of establishments, and these relationships are
statistically significant.
The dynamics of these growth rates are such that sectors that grow fast in
(growth of 88% in the number of establishments) and distorts the graph. We do not exclude it in
our estimations.
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Table 2.2: Lagged correlations with value added growth
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
value added growth 1 0.190 0.044
- (0.042) (0.674)
employment growth 0.826 0.338 0.217
(0.000) (0.001) (0.068)
number of establishments growth 0.608 0.231 -0.078
(0.000) (0.013) (0.453)
one decade, do not necessarily grow fast in the subsequent decade. The lagged
correlation of value added growth rates is only 0.19 on table 2.2. Furthermore,
the variation in growth rates across sectors and decades is large, as can be seen
in figure 2.4. Some decades, as the 1940s experience growth in value added that
is much higher for all sectors than others. Over all decades, average value added
growth is 3.7% per year with a standard error of 2.8%. Variations across sectors
within decades accounts for 64% of the variance in growth rates, and the variation
across decades accounts for 38%.10
However, the distribution of value added, employment and number of estab-
lishments shares across sectors is very stable over time. See figures 2.5-2.7. The
coincidence of this fact, with the very large variation of growth rates is surprising,
as one sector experiencing very high growth could increase variance of the share
10These numbers are the result of a standard variance decomposition. They do not add to one
because of the covariance.
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distribution, but these present a very predictable pattern.
Finally, there is a tight relationship between the size of sectors from one decade
to the other, but over the course of the eight decades in the data, this correlation
disappears, as can be seen in figure 2.8. The same holds for employment and number
of establishments (not shown).
2.4 Model
2.4.1 Environment
Time is discrete and infinite, t = −∞, ...,−1, 0, 1, ...,∞. Goods are divided into
sectors, types and vintages. The set of sectors S is fixed, finite and has measure 1.
In each period a new type arises exogenously in each sector. Denote with sτ the
type of good that arose in time τ and sector s ∈ S. Vintage τ is the set of types
that arose in period τ .
In any time period, there is a large mass of entrepreneurs that may enter a
type and create a new differentiated variety. We denote firms and varieties with
ω and write ω ∈ sτ when variety ω is in type sτ . At any point in time, each
of the existing types has a continuum of varieties. Firms observe demand and
set prices. Consumers observe prices and choose quantities. In each period, each
consumer is endowed with one unit of labor, which he supplies inelastically in a
perfectly competitive market. Population Lt evolves exogenously at a constant rate
gL: Lt+1 = gLLt.
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2.4.2 Demand
A representative consumer maximizes a discounted flow of per capita utility:
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt ln(Ct/Lt)
where Ct =
[∑
s∈S
t∑
τ=−∞
C
(η−1)/η
tsτ
]η/(η−1)
Ctsτ =
[∫
ω∈sτ
ct(ω)
(σ−1)/σdω
]σ/(σ−1)
,
β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount rate and ct(ω) is the quantity of variety ω consumed
at time t. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is one for simplicity. The
per period utility Ct is nested a CES of the existing types and varieties within a
type. The elasticity of substitution between types is η > 1 and the elasticity of
substitution between varieties is σ > η. With η > 1, an increase in a type’s price
decreases spending on it. The assumption that the elasticity of substitution between
types within and across sectors is the same to save on notation.11 The consumer’s
budget constraint is
∞∑
t=0
∑
s∈S
t∑
τ=−∞
∫
ω∈sτ
ct(ω)pt(ω) ≤ W
where pt(ω) is the price of variety ω at time t and lifetime earnings is W = W˜0 +∑∞
t=0 Ltwt with W˜0 is initial wealth and Ltwt is period t’s income. The allocation
11This assumption would matter only if the distribution of new technology draws depended on
previous draws within the sector. Below, we assume that technologies of new types are indepen-
dently distributed across sectors and time.
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of consumer income is
Xt = PtCt =
βt
1− βW total spending at t (2.4.1)
Xtsτ =
(
Ptsτ
Pt
)1−η
Xt spending on type sτ (2.4.2)
xt(ω) =
[
pt(ω)
Ptsτ
]1−σ
Xtsτ spending on variety ω ∈ sτ
where Pt =
[∑
s∈S
t∑
τ=−∞
P 1−ηtsτ ds
]1/(1−η)
Ptsτ =
[∫
ω∈sτ
pt(ω)
1−σdω
]1/(1−σ)
.
2.4.3 Supply
All firms producing type sτ at time t have the same technology. The labor require-
ment to produce c units of good ω of type τ is
ftsτ +
c
ztsτ
where ftsτ and ztsτ are class and time-specific productivity parameters that evolve
exogenously according to
ztsτ = z¯τzsτ (t− τ)z ,
ftsτ = f¯τfsτ (t− τ)f
where z¯τ+1 = gz z¯τ
f¯τ+1 = gf f¯τ
gz > 1, f < 0, z > 0. The expressions for ztsτ and ftsτ have three terms. First, z¯τ
and f¯τ govern long-run growth. Relative to the previous vintage, labor productivity
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of a new vintage is gz times larger in the variable cost and 1/gf times larger in the
fixed cost. Because in the data the number of employees per firm generally increases
over time, we allow fixed cost to be potentially larger for newer types, gf > 1, though
we assume that gη−1z > gf in order for the price index to be finite below. Second, the
pair (zsτ , fsτ ) is a random variable independently drawn across vintage and sectors
from a time-invariant joint cumulative distribution G. This distribution captures
idiosyncratic growth in value added and number of establishments across time and
sectors. If G is degenerate, then all sectors grow at the same rate. For convenience,
we assume that G is bivariate log-normal with mean parameters normalized to
zero. Third, (t − τ)z and (t − τ)f capture learning within types. Since (zsτ , fsτ )
are independent across vintages, z and f govern the correlation of growth rates
of value added and of number of establishments across time within sectors—sectors
with a large technology draw today grow faster in the following periods if z and f
are large.
2.5 Balanced growth path
We study only the balanced growth path. There are two equilibrium conditions.
First, assuming goods are perishable, the labor market clears when Xt = Ltwt for all
t. From intertemporal maximization in equation (2.4.1), wages evolve at a constant
rate:
wt+1
wt
=
β
gL
(2.5.1)
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Second, there is free entry. At any period t, there is an infinite mass of entrepreneurs
that may exit or enter any of the existing types of goods sτ with s ∈ S and τ ≤ t.
The decision is static since there are no sunk costs. Entry requires only the fixed
cost of production wtftsτ . Firms that produce type sτ at time t set prices ptsτ =
µwt
ztsτ
where µ = σ
σ−1 is the markup. The zero-profit condition is
pitsτ =
Xtsτ
σMtsτ
− wtftsτ = 0
≡ Mtsτ = Xtsτ
σwtftsτ
=
(
ptsτ
Pt
) (1−η)(σ−1)
(σ−η)
(
Lt
σftsτ
) σ−1
σ−η
(2.5.2)
and Ptsτ = M
1/(1−σ)
tsτ ptsτ =
(
pσ−1tsτ P
1−η
t
σftsτ
Lt
) 1
σ−η
(2.5.3)
where line (2.5.2) uses equation (2.4.2), Ptsτ = M
1/(1−σ)
tsτ ptsτ , and Xt/wt = Lt.
Substituting in the definition of Pt, we have (appendix H):
Pt =
[∑
s∈S
t∑
τ=−∞
P 1−ηtsτ
]1/(1−η)
=
(
Lt
σf¯t
) 1
1−σ µwt
z¯t
(P˜t)
σ−η
σ−1 (2.5.4)
where P˜t =
{
t∑
τ=−∞
[
gτ−t1 (t− τ)1
∑
s∈S
(z1−σsτ fsτ )
(1−η)
(σ−η)
]} 1
1−η
(2.5.5)
g1 =
[
g(1−σ)z gf
] 1−η
σ−η > 1
1 =
(
1− η
σ − η
)
[(1− σ)z + f ]
Term
[(
Lt
σf¯t
) 1
1−σ µwt
z¯t
]
is the standard price index in a model without types or pro-
ductivity dynamics, with
(
Lt
σf¯t
) 1
1−σ
capturing the variety effect and µwt
z¯t
capturing
the price per variety. Term P˜t is the stochastic component of the price index. As
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the number of sectors approaches infinity, it converges to a constant
P˜t → (Φ1Γ1)
1
1−η
where Φ1 =
∫ [
z(1−σ)f
] 1−η
σ−η dG(z, f) (2.5.6)
Γ1 =
∞∑
r=0
g−r1 r
1 ≈ log(g1)1+1Γ(1 + 1) (2.5.7)
and Γ is the gamma function. Heterogeneity across sectors appears in constant
Φ1 < ∞ with G log-normal. All learning is captured in Γ1, which is a constant
because fast learning in new vintages is exactly offset by a slowdown in the rate of
learning of old vintages. In the definition of Γ1, (g
−r
1 r
1) is the probability density
function of a gamma distribution with parameters ln(g1) and (1 + 1).
12 When the
number of sectors is large, the price index evolves as
Pt+1
Pt
=
β
gz
(
gf
gσL
) 1
σ−1
< 1
since gσ−1z > gf . Normalizing wt = 1, equation (2.5.4) gives the price index Pt as
a function of exogenous variables. Plugging Pt back in equations (2.5.2), (2.5.3)
and (2.4.2), we get the mass of firms, price index and spending on each type. The
12The approximation in equation (2.5.7) is only didactic. It is not used in the computation.
If the model were in continuous time and the birth of new vintages occurred continuously, then
equation (2.5.7) would hold with an equal sign. But modeling the birth of new vintages as a
continuous is unappealing because it fails to capture the phenomenon we are trying to explain.
The invention of mass-produced automobiles, household appliances and personal consumers were
all discontinuous breaks from past inventions.
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distribution of the mass of firms across types is
Mtsτ
Mt
=
(ztsτftsτ )
1−σ
σ−η∑
s∈S
∑t
τ=−∞
(
z1−ηtsτ ftsτ
) 1−σ
σ−η
(2.5.8)
=
gτ−t2 (t− τ)2 (z1−ηsτ fsτ )
1−σ
σ−η
M˜t
(2.5.9)
where M˜t =
∑
s∈S
t∑
τ=−∞
gτ−t2 (t− τ)2
∑
s∈S
(
z1−ηsτ fsτ
) 1−σ
σ−η (2.5.10)
g2 =
[
g(1−η)z gf
] 1−σ
σ−η > 1
2 =
(
1− σ
σ − η
)
[(1− η)z + f ]
Analogous to the price index, M˜t is a stochastic component. If the number of sectors
is sufficiently large, it converges
M˜t → (Φ2Γ2)
where Φ2 =
∫ [
z(1−η)f
] 1−σ
σ−η dG(z, f)
Γ2 =
∞∑
s=0
g−s2 s
2 ≈ log(g2)2+1Γ(2 + 1)
The total mass of firms at time t is
Mt =
(
Lt
σf t
)
M˜tP˜
η−1
t (2.5.11)
The stochastic component M˜tP˜
η−1
t → Φ2Γ2Φ1Γ1 as the number of sectors approaches
infinity. The term
(
Lt
σf t
)
is the mass of firms in a monopolistic competition model
with no sector and fixed entry cost f t. It grows at a constant rate gL/gf . Using
prices Ptsτ and Pt in equation (2.5.3) and (2.5.4), we get the distribution of revenue
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across types:
Xtsτ
Xt
=
(
Ptsτ
Pt
)1−η
=
gτ−t1 (t− τ)1 (z1−σsτ fsτ )
1−η
σ−η
P˜ 1−ηt
(2.5.12)
where P˜t =
{
t∑
τ=−∞
[
gτ−t1 (t− τ)1
∑
s∈S
(z1−σsτ fsτ )
(1−η)
(σ−η)
]} 1
1−η
and Xt = wtLt. This completes the solution to the model. All aggregate variables,
prices Pt, mass of firms Mt and spending Xt and time-type specific prices Ptsτ , mass
of firms Mtsτ and total spending Xtsτ and spending per firm xtsτ are functions of
exogenous variables.
2.5.1 Characteristics of equilibrium
Aggregate growth Assuming the number of sectors is sufficiently large so that
P˜ and M˜ are constants, we have the following growth rates:
Xt+1/Pt+1
Xt/Pt
=
(
gσL
gf
) 1
σ−1
gz aggregate real value added (2.5.13)
wt+1/Pt+1
wt/Pt
=
(
gL
gf
) 1
σ−1
gz per capita real value added
Mt+1
Mt
=
gL
gf
total mass of firms (2.5.14)
Vintages Summing over sectors, we get the dynamics of a vintage:
Xtτ
Xt
=
gτ−t1 (t− τ)1
Γ1
share of value added (2.5.15)
Mtτ
Mt
=
gτ−t2 (t− τ)2
Γ2
share of mass of firms
The evolution of market shares of a vintage has the shape of the probability density
function of a gamma distribution. As in Gort and Klepper [1982], when a new type
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of goods arises, the mass of firms initially increases, reaches a point of zero net entry
and exit, and eventually declines with a shake out. The same dynamics holds for
value added.
Types The distribution of sales and plants and across types within a vintage is
independent of the vintage and of its age. When the number of sectors is large and
G is a bivariate log-normal, this distribution is also bivariate log-normal:
Prob
(
Xtsτ
Xtτ
≤ x and Mtsτ
Mtτ
≤ m
)
=
([
Ptsτ
Ptτ
]1−η
≤ x and Mtsτ
Mtτ
≤ m
)
= Prob
([
z(1−σ)f
] 1−η
σ−η ≤ Φ1x and
[
z(1−η)f
] 1−σ
σ−η ≤ Φ2m
)
⇒
(
Mtsτ
Mtτ
,
Xtsτ
Xtτ
)
∼ logN (0,Σxm)
where Σxm appears in appendix I.
Sectors The observable distribution of market shares across sectors is an affine
transformation of the bivariate normal the sum of log-normal distributions
(
Xtτ
Xt
, Mtτ
Mt
)
:
Xts
Xt
=
t∑
τ=−∞
gτ−t1 (t− τ)1
Γ1
Xtτ
Xt
Mts
Mt
=
t∑
τ=−∞
gτ−t2 (t− τ)2
Γ2
Mtτ
Mt
which can only be solved for numerically. In the limit, when g is large or  is small,
only the output of the most recent vintage matters, and the distribution of markets
shares across sectors is equal to the distribution across types. If older types are
slow to disappear, the distribution of market shares across sectors is degenerate—
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all sectors have the same market shares because all past draws (ztsτ , ftsτ ) have the
same weight as current draws.13
2.6 Estimation
Parameters We estimate the model using the simulated method of moments.
There are 5 parameters and 17 moments. The data are described in section 2 above.
We fix the elasticity of substitution across sectors η = 3 and σ = 7.5 from Broda
and Weinstein [2006].14 We take the growth rates gz = 1.18, gL = 1.21, gf = 1.07 to
exactly match aggregate growth rate in real value added, employment and number
of establishments over the period of 1900 to 1980 in the data.15 The five estimated
parameters are (z, f ,Σ). Parameters z, f determine the evolution of exogenous
firm productivity and fixed costs within a vintage. Type-specific productivity and
fixed costs (zτs, fτs) are jointly distributed according to a log-bivariate log-normal
with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix Σ, itself with variance parameters
13These cases are the limits as the variance of the gamma distributions gτ−t1 (t − τ)1 and
gτ−t2 (t− τ)2 goes from zero to infinity. With continuous time, this variance is (1 + )/ log(g)2.
14At this stage we estimated the σ parameter even though we believe we need more data for
the identification.
15The value of gL is the geometric average of the growth in employment per decade in the data.
gf is then imputed by solving for it in equation (2.5.14), where the left hand side is the geometric
average of the aggregate growth of establishments per decade. Finally gz is solved in the same
way in equation (2.5.13) where the left hand side is the geometric average of aggregate real value
added growth per decade, using the current estimate of σ.
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σz, σf and correlation ρzf .
Moments Selected moments describe the stylized facts of section 2, on value
added, number of establishments, and employment by sector and decade between
1900 and 1980. A period in the model is one decade in the data. We match the first
two autocorrelations of value added and establishment growth and the contempo-
raneous correlation between value added and establishment growth. We match the
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles and maximum of the distribution of sec-
toral growth rate of value added within a decade, normalized by the mean growth
rate of the decade.16 We repeat these moments for the distribution of growth rates
of number of establishments.
Identification The parameters to estimate are well identified. The learning pa-
rameters, z and f are associated with autocorrelations of growth rates. As z
increases, most productivity growth occurs within a vintage. As a result, success-
ful shocks (high-z types) take longer to be overtaken, and the correlation of value
added growth rates across decades within sectors decreases. Similarly, f governs
the autocorrelation in growth rates of establishments across decades within sectors.
The variance parameters σz and σf govern the distribution of growth rates. The
variance of productivity σz governs the variance of value added growth rates across
sectors, and the variance of fixed costs σf govern variance of number of establish-
16These latter moments are calculated for each decade and then normalized by the decade mean
growth. The average of each moment across decades is the reported value.
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ments across sectors. The correlation of these shocks ρzf governs cross-sectional
correlation between the growth of value added and number of establishments.
Simulation We simulate the model for S = 20 sectors and T = 50 periods. We
fix two matrices with dimensions 2T ×N with random draws from a bivariate log-
normal distribution, truncated at the top 5% for zsτ , and the bottom 5% for fsτ .
For each parameter guess, we use Σ to transform these distributions to get draws
(zsτ , fsτ ). Details of this procedure is given in Appendix J. There are 2T ×N draws
because we simulate the model for periods t = T + 1, T + 2, ...., 2T and use the first
T draws to construct the history of shocks for the initial periods. For each period
t = T + 1, ..., 2T and each sector s = 1, ..., S, we calculate the market shares from
equations (2.5.9) and (2.5.12):
Xtsτ
Xt
=
gτ−t1 (t− τ)1 (z1−σsτ fsτ )
1−η
σ−η
P˜ 1−ηt
Mtsτ
Mt
=
gτ−t2 (t− τ)2 (z1−ηsτ fsτ )
1−σ
σ−η
M˜t
where P˜t =
[
t∑
τ=t−T
gτ−t1 (t− τ)1
S∑
s=1
(
z1−σsτ fsτ
) 1−η
σ−η
] 1
1−η
M˜t =
t∑
τ=t−T
gτ−t2 (t− τ)2
S∑
s=1
(
z1−ηsτ fsτ
) 1−σ
σ−η
M˜t and P˜t vary across periods only because of randomness in the draws (zsτ , fsτ ).
They differ slightly from their theoretical counterparts because they are calculated
over a finite number of periods. Sectoral shares in value added and number of
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establishments are
Xts
Xt
=
t∑
τ=t−T
Xtsτ
Xt
for t = T + 1, ..., 2T and s = 1, ..., S
Mts
Mt
=
t∑
τ=t−T
Mtsτ
Mt
for t = T + 1, ..., 2T and s = 1, ..., S
Denote these shares with xts =
Xts
Xt
and mts =
Mts
Mt
. Using equations (2.5.4) and
(2.5.11), we get sectoral growth rates in real value added and number of establish-
ments:
Xst+1
Xst
Pt
Pt+1
=
xst+1
xst
(
gσL
gf
) 1
σ−1
gz
(
P˜t+1
P˜t
)σ−η
1−σ
Mst+1
Mst
=
mst+1
mst
M˜t+1
M˜t
(
P˜t+1
P˜t
)η−1
gL
gf
Given our assumptions of frictionless labor markets and constant markups, the
distribution of labor across sectors is the same as value added, lts =
Lts
Lt
= Xts
Xt
,
and the sectoral growth in employment is Lt+1s
Lts
= ltsgL. These assumptions are
well supported by the linear relationships between value added and employment in
figures 2.1(a) and 2.3(a).
2.7 Results
The values in the data and of the simulations for the targeted moments are displayed
in table 2.3 and the resulting parameters are in table 2.4. We find that the model
does a good job of capturing both the dynamics and distribution of growth rates,
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given the simple structure and small number of parameters estimated. The dy-
namics of growth are well captured, in particular the first autocorrelations of value
added and establishment growth, which are just under predicted by the model but
within the same order of magnitude. Given that the autocorrelations with two lags
are non-significant in the data, they are not matched very closely as they have a
very small weight in the estimation.
The distribution of value added growth rates has a very similar degree of spread
as that of the data, however the lower tail is not well matched. Across larger quan-
tiles the model does better, and captures the top of the tail very closely. Similarly,
growth in the number of establishments is well matched, but the model also under
predicts the 10th quantile. In table 2.5 we display the quantiles of the distribution
of shares of value added and number of establishments from the data and those
produced by the model and we see that the model is able to capture the general
properties of these two distributions, but fails at capturing both tails of these, as
these sectors are generally more homogeneous for these distributions.
To further assess the estimation we display the same plots relating shares and
growth rates of value added and number of establishments as in the stylized facts
in figures 2.9-2.12. The simulated data maintains the same positive relationship
between value added and number of establishments growth, with the slope of the
regression line being a bit smaller (.83 vs .61). The sectoral shares of these two
variables are also positively correlated, with a smaller slope as well (1.16 vs .72).
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Finally, the dynamic relationships of value added shares are closely matched, both
in the data and the simulation a sector that has a high market share today has a
high market share tomorrow, but this does not significantly predict the share eight
decades in the future.
We study the dynamics product cycle by displaying the path of the mass of firms
for several quantiles of shocks in figure 2.13, where we use the estimated parameters
and equation (2.5.9) while the time since the the vintage was introduced t − τ
increases, assuming that M˜t is constant in figure 2.13. The graph can be interpreted
as an impulse response as we assume no further shocks occur as age increases.
The product cycle peaks in 19 years and the shakeout period is long lived, even
80 years after the introduction, there are firms producing vintage. This length to
the peak number of firms is comparable to that found across products by Gort and
Klepper [1982], where on average for their products it takes 24 years. There is much
variation in the number of firms that these innovations introduce, which depends on
the value of the shocks (z1−ηsτ fsτ )
1−σ
σ−η that the firm experiences. The 90th quantile
shock implies that at the peak it has 4 times more firms than the median shock,
and 19 times more firms than the 10th quantile shock. where some have in their
peak eight firms, and others have 50.
Value added responds with less variation in response to an innovation for the
same values of zsτ and fsτ as before, as can be seen in figure 2.14. While the 90th
percentile shock is still relatively very large, 9 times larger than the median and 12
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times larger than the 10th percentile shock, amongst shocks below the 75th per-
centile they are much more concentrated as the paths mostly overlap. Note that the
sorting is not necessarily preserved, as the shock that produced the 25th percentile
number of firms generates more value added than that for the 75th percentile. This
occurs as the value added and number of firms shares evaluate the contribution of
the fsτ shock differently: for value added the shock component in equation (2.5.12)
is (z1−σsτ fsτ )
1−η
σ−η , thus fsτ is raised to the power
1−η
σ−η instead of
1−σ
σ−η . Given that
η < σ, good (small), draws of fsτ imply relatively lower value added shares than
number of establishments shares.
If we were to sort shocks by their contribution to the value added shares, using
(z1−σsτ fsτ )
1−η
σ−η as in figure 2.15 , we can see that the 90th percentile is actually much
smaller than that induced by the sorting by number of establishments, which is 45%
larger. These shocks do vary more amongst themselves than before, yet are still
more concentrated than the number of establishments, the 90th percentile shock has
3 times more value added produced than the median and 10 times the 10th percentile
shock. Thus, while we observe much variation in the number of establishments that
different product cycles feature, they do not imply as large variation in how much
output they produce.
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2.8 Concluding Remarks
We study the product cycle using a quantitative growth model of exogenous growth.
First, we describe historical data on value added, number of employees and estab-
lishments for the United States and present several stylized facts that show that
growth in value added is very volatile across sectors, and that value added, employ-
ment and number of establishments covary very strongly contemporaneously.
Second, we develop and estimate a model that allows us to measure parameters
that determine the typical product cycle and also matches the aggregate data. The
deep parameters uncover a product cycle that lasts 19 years and is long lived, with
firms in operation 80 years after the innovation. These product cycles generate much
variation in the number of firms, depending on the characteristics of the particular
innovation. They imply much less variation in value added, where these cycles are
more similar cross the shock distribution.
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2.9 Figures
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Figure 2.1: Annualized growth rate of value added vs annualized growth rates of
employment and number of establishments
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Figure 2.2: Normalized sectoral shares of value added vs normalized sectoral shares
of employment and number of establishments
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Figure 2.3: Normalized sectoral shares of value added vs normalized sectoral shares
of employment and number of establishments
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Figure 2.4: Kernel densities of annualized sectoral growth by decade
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Figure 2.5: Kernel density of sectoral variations in the log of value added by decade.
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Figure 2.6: Kernel density of sectoral variations in the log of value employment by
decade.
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Figure 2.7: Kernel density of sectoral variations in the log of number of establish-
ments by decade.
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Figure 2.8: Persistence in value added shares across decades
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Figure 2.9: Annualized growth rates of value added vs establishments from the
simulations
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Figure 2.10: Normalized sectoral shares of value added vs normalized sectoral shares
of number of establishments from the simulations
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Figure 2.11: Value added shares of decade t and t+ 1 from the simulations
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Figure 2.12: Value added shares of decade t and t+ 8 from the simulations
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Figure 2.13: Path of number of establishments after an innovation
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Figure 2.14: Path of number of establishments after an innovation
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Figure 2.15: Path of number of establishments after an innovation, sorted by value
added
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2.10 Tables
Table 2.3: Targeted moments
Correlations
Moment Data Model
Autocorrelation VA, t+ 1 0.190 0.108
Autocorrelation VA, t+ 2 0.044 -0.069
Autocorrelation M, t+ 1 0.230 0.129
Autocorrelation M, t+ 2 0.048 -0.024
Cross Correlation VA, M 0.610 0.510
Distribution of value added growth rates
Moment Data Model
VA Growth, 10th Quantile 0.750 0.822
VA Growth, 25th Quantile 0.850 0.864
VA Growth, 50th Quantile 0.960 0.940
VA Growth, 75th Quantile 1.090 1.055
VA Growth, 90th Quantile 1.310 1.212
VA Growth, Maximum 1.510 1.522
Distribution of number of establishments growth rates
Moment Data Model
M Growth, 10th Quantile 0.700 0.831
M Growth, 25th Quantile 0.830 0.865
M Growth, 50th Quantile 0.970 0.927
M Growth, 75th Quantile 1.110 1.019
M Growth, 90th Quantile 1.300 1.199
M Growth, Maximum 1.760 1.683
Results from the estimation of the model, displayed in the
first panel are the targeted moments of the autocorrela-
tions of sectoral value added growth with itself, of number
of establishments growth with itself, and the cross correla-
tion of contemporary value added growth and number of
establishments growth rates. The second and third pan-
els contains the quantiles from the sectoral distribution of
value added and number of establishments growth rates,
normalized by the mean growth rate of the decade, and
afterwards averaged across sectors.
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Table 2.4: Parameter Estimates
z f σz σf ρzf
0.21 -.07 .17 1.23 .64
Notes: The table reports the pa-
rameter values estimated with
Method of Simulated Moments.
Table 2.5: Nontargeted moments
Distribution of normalized shares of value added
Moment Data Model
VA Share, 10th Quantile 0.270 0.822
VA Share, 25th Quantile 0.410 0.864
VA Share, 50th Quantile 0.780 0.940
VA Share, 75th Quantile 1.490 1.055
VA Share, 90th Quantile 1.960 1.212
VA Share, Maximum 2.420 1.522
Distribution of normalized shares of number of establishments
Moment Data Model
M Share, 10th Quantile 0.080 0.509
M Share, 25th Quantile 0.240 0.682
M Share, 50th Quantile 0.580 0.871
M Share, 75th Quantile 1.490 1.187
M Share, 90th Quantile 2.510 1.494
M Share, Maximum 3.720 2.121
Results from the estimation of the model, displayed are quantiles
of the distribution of shares of value added and the number of
establishments.
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Appendices
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A Details of the Computational Method
The model is solved globally for the policy and value functions using Value Function
Iteration. I discretize the state space (k, b, z) by generating a grid for capital that
ranges from 5× 10−4 to 2 times the non-stochastic steady state value of capital. I
generate log-spaced grids of size 60 for these two states. The stochastic process is
discretized using Tauchen and Hussey’s method, with 5 grid points. As mentioned
in Section 1.4.2, for every solution with parameters pi = (ρ
i, σiz, θ
i, ωi, ki0, κ
i
0, κ
i
1, α
i),
I will perform a bisection of the mean of the fixed cost parameter micf and the
equity issuance cost parameter φi to get the exit rate and the average ratio of
equity issuance to fixed assets to match the data for every firm type i.
The estimator is from Lee and Ingram [1991]. The goal is to estimate the
parameter vector pi using data vector {di}, where this contains for every firm i all
observations Ti of the relevant data series. These vectors are assumed to be assumed
to be i.i.d across i but there may be dependence within i. Let hmap from the data to
the moments, so this function takes the appropriate means and standard deviations,
correlations and autocorrelation and frequency of positive equity issuance from the
series h(di). I estimate each firm’s parameters independently. For the simulated
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data, given that I have the stationary distribution of the policy functions of the
model it is not necessary for me to simulate the firms, as I can obtain any moment
produced by the model from it. Denote the moments generated by parameter vector
pi by h
m(pi), using the stationary distributions µ
i, and define the sample moment
vector as
gi(x, p) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
[h(dj)− hm (pi)]
Then, for some random weight matrix Wˆ which converges in probability to a de-
terministic positive definite matrix W the Method of Simulated Moments estimator
is given by
pˆi = arg min
p
gi(x, p)
′Wˆgi(x, p)
The weight matrix Wˆ is chosen to be for each firm type i the inverse of the covari-
ance matrix of the moments. I first use a global optimization algorithm (DIRECT-L
from the NLopt library) and a local optimizer afterwards for more precise estima-
tion within this minima (Sbplx). The programming language used are Julia and C
for the modeling, and R for the data related sections.
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B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Similarly to Li et al. [2016], I use Theorem 9.6 in Stokey
et al. [1989] to establish the existence of the industry equilibrium defined in Section
1.3.3. Theorem 9.8 establishes uniqueness of the policy functions. The proposition
can be restated by defining an operator T in the space of bounded function as
T (V )(k, b, z) = x(k, b, z)V E(k, b, z) + (1− x(k, b, z))[V O(k, b, z)− cef (k, b, z)]
where
V E(k, b, z) = pi(k, z) + (1− δ)k − (1 + r)b,
V O(k, b, z) = max
k′,b′
Φ(e(k, k′, b, b′, z)) + β
∫
z′
V (k′, b′, z′)Q(dz′, z),
and
e(k, k′, b, b′, z) = pi(k, z) + (1− δ)k − (1 + r)b− k′ − Ai(k, k′) + b′
subject to
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(1 + r)b′ ≤ θ(1− δ)k′
Lemma 1. Let C(S) be the space of all bounded continuous functions, where S =
K×B ×Z. The operator T defined above has an unique fixed point V ∗ ∈ C(S) for
all v0 ∈ C(S) initial guesses. (Theorem 9.6 of Stokey et al. [1989])
Proof. This is established in Stokey et al. [1989], we only have to show that As-
sumptions 9.4-9.7 hold:
• Assumption 9.4: K×B are convex Borel sets in R2 with Borel subsets Σ(K)×
Σ(B). These assumptions are easily satisfied if for example K = [0, k] and
B = [b, b]. The firm would never choose a capital stock larger than k =
zk+k(1− δ) because otherwise profits are negative. The upper bound for the
debt can then be derived from the collateral constraint b = θ(1− δ)k/(1 + r).
The lower bound must also be well defined because given that all firms are
born with zero debt and the firms have no incentive to save after they reach
their steady state value of capital given that they discount at a higher rate
than the debt returns: if it sacrifices one dollar in dividends today, it returns
1 + r tomorrow, but they discount this at rate β. Given the assumed value of
r as detailed in Section 1.4.2, β × (1 + r) < 1, so the firm prefers to set b = 0
to b < 0, so that b = 0.
• Assumption 9.5: Z is a compact (Borel) set in R with its Borel subsets Σ(Z),
and the transition function Q on (Z,Σ(Z)) has the Feller property. This
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is trivially satisfied by the Log-Normal AR(1) process as it is non-negative,
and its transition maps the any bounded and continuous function back into a
bounded and continuous function.
• Assumption 9.6: The constraint correspondence Γ(k, b, z) : K×B×Z → K×B
given by:
Γ(k, b, z) = {(k′, b′)|θk′(1− δ) ≥ b′}
is non-empty, compact-valued and continuous.
1. Non-empty: k′ = 0 and b′ = 0 belong to Γ(k, b, z), thus non-empty.
2. Compact-valued: Pick any sequence {k′n, b′n} ∈ Γ(k, b, z) for any z such
that it converges, {k′n, b′n} → (k′c, b′c). Given that the constraint is linear,
it must be the case that θk′c(1− δ) ≥ b′c, independent of the z. Γ(k, b, z)
is closed and compact valued (contains all of its limit points).
3. To show that Γ(k, b, z) is continuous I will show that it is both up-
per hemi-continuous and lower hemi-continuous. Since I have shown
it is nonempty and bounded (given the definitions in Assumption 9.4),
Theorem 3.4 gives that it is upper hemi-continuous. Pick any sequence
{k′n, b′n, z′n}, such that it converges, {k′n, b′n, z′n} → (k′c, b′c, z′c). To prove
lower hemi-continuity I must show that for every (f ′c, g
′
c) ∈ Γ(k′c, b′c, z′c)
there exists N ≥ 1 and a sequence (f ′n, g′n) ∈ Γ(k′n, b′n, z′n) that is conver-
gent (f ′n, g
′
n)→ (f ′c, g′c) ∀n ≥ N . Given that (k′c, b′c) ∈ Γ(k′c, b′c, z′c). Con-
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vergence of the initial sequence means that for all {δi > 0|i ∈ {k, b, z}}
there exists some {Ni ∈ Z|i ∈ {k, b, z}} where for all n > Ni, |k′n− k′c| <
δk, |b′n − b′c| < δb and |z′n − z′c| < δz. Let N = max{Nk, Nb, Nz} and
(f ′n, g
′
n) = (akk
′
n, abb
′
n), where ak = f
′
c/k
′
c and ab = g
′
c/b
′
c then it is the
case that (f ′n, g
′
n)→ (akk′c, abb′c) = (f ′c, g′c) for all n ≥ N .
• Assumption 9.7: β ∈ (0, 1) and the function F (k, b, z, k′, b′) is bounded and
continuous,
F (k, b, z, k′, b′) = pi(k, z) + (1− δ)k − (1 + r)b+ (1− x(k, b, z))
× [k′ − A(k, k′) + b′ − cef (k, b, z) + 1[e<0]φe.]
given that K×B is bounded, and all the component functions are continuous,
this is satisfied.
Lemma 2. Suppose S = K × B × Z, Γ, Q, F and β satisfy Assumptions 9.4-9.7.
If they additionally satisfy 9.10 and 9.11 then the value function is strictly concave
and the optimal policies are unique and continuous. (Theorem 9.8 of Stokey et al.
[1989]).
Proof. • Assumption 9.10: Given z, the F function satisfies, for all t ∈ (0, 1)
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F [tk0 + (1− t)k1, tb0 + (1− t)b1, z, tk′0 + (1− t)k′1, tb′0 + (1− t)b′1]
≥ tF [k0, b0, z0, k′0, b′0] + (1− t)F [k1, b1, z1, k′1, b′1]
And strictly if any of the variables are different. This holds given that the
production function has decreasing returns to scale, even when we take into
account the pricing function. The only concerns are the equity issuance cost,
but given that it is linear, it is weakly concave; and the exit decision which is
a value along a log-normal CDF, and changes monotonically and continuously
in the same direction of the elements contained in the brackets it multiplies
• Assumption 9.11: For all z ∈ Z and all (k′n, b′n) ∈ K × B for n = 1, 2, if
yn ∈ Γ(k′n, b′n, z), then tyn + (1− t)yn ∈ Γ(tk′1 + (1− t)k′2, tb′1 + (1− t)b′2, z) for
all t ∈ [0, 1]. Given that the constraint is linear this holds trivially.
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C Industry Labor Share
To measure the labor share of each industry for the TFPR analysis I will use a
similar definition as Hsieh and Song [2015], where it is defined as
labor share =
labor income
labor income + total profit + depreciation + value added tax
.
Ideally, this should be equal to aggregate labor share of 50% [?] if you had a full
sample of firms, but due to accounting and statistical discrepancies from reported
data this is not the case in the full sample of firms that they use, and is not the case
in my restricted sample either. The discrepancy arises from firms reporting only
wages as part of payroll and a discrepancy between reported income and reported
value added.
I obtain industrial sector Labor Income data from University of Michigan’s China
Data Center; Depreciation, Value Added Tax and Total Profits from the relevant for
each year’s China Statistical Yearbook. I obtain this data for all the manufacturing
sectors for 2005-2008. As expected, the average labor share for my sample is 32%,
less than the aggregate share of 50%, so I will inflate labor income by a constant
factor across all years and sectors, increasing by .0001 until the average labor share
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is exactly 50%.
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D Data Comments
I use data on all manufacturing firms from 2000-2013 in the CSMAR database.
Manufacturing firms are those that begin with the letter “C” in the 2012 CRSC
Industry Code. The precise variable items from the CSMAR database are:
• Fixed Assets: A001212000
• Short Term Debt: A002101000
• Long Term Debt: A002201000
• Bonds: A002203000
• Total Assets: A001000000
• Profits (Operating Profits): B001300000
• Investment: C002006000
• Proceeds from issuing shares: C003001000
• Payroll: C001020000
• Depreciation: D000103000
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• Monthly Market Capitalization: MSMVTTL
• The proceeds from issuing shares variable has missing data, but is coded
erroneously as ocurring in the beginning of the following year as confirmed by
comparing with a secondary source for the data, the ChinaScope database.
This is corrected for the periods for which there is data in that entry. Some
firms erroneously code their payroll/labor income data and fixed assets as
negative, and this is also corrected.
95
E Different Lags of TFPR Innovations
In this appendix I present the results of adding one and two more lags of TFPR
innovations to the regression equation 1.2.5, which shows that the result is robust
to longer delays between the period of when the innovation is first observed, and
when the capital is successfully adjusted.
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Table E.1: Dispersion of MRPK and Productivity Shocks with One Lag of Inno-
vations
Dependent variable:
log(MRPK)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(TFPR) Innovation 0.641∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.015) (0.023)
log(TFPR) Innovation in t− 1 0.380∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.010) (0.014)
Capital Stock −0.496∗∗∗ −0.507∗∗∗ −0.680∗∗∗ −0.708∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.028)
Labor Input 0.583∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.043)
Lagged log(TFPR) 0.197∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.044)
Constant −3.361∗∗∗ −3.409∗∗∗ −1.328∗∗∗ −1.068∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.168) (0.084) (0.407)
Year F.E. No Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. No No Yes No
Individual F.E. No No No Yes
Observations 9,635 9,635 9,635 9,635
R2 0.295 0.302 0.874 0.907
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
I report the results of the regression of equation (1.2.5) for different sets of controls,
where the log(TFPR) Innovations are given as the estimated residual of the model of
equation (1.2.4), the Capital Stock is given by fixed assets and TFPR is defined as in
equation (1.2.3). In parentheses are heretoskedasticity robus standard errors.
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Table E.2: Dispersion of MRPK and Productivity Shocks with Two Lags of Inno-
vations
Dependent variable:
log(MRPK)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(TFPR) Innovation 0.683∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.016) (0.024)
log(TFPR) Innovation in t− 1 0.529∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.015) (0.024)
log(TFPR) Innovation in t− 2 0.274∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.015) (0.022)
Capital Stock −0.474∗∗∗ −0.485∗∗∗ −0.676∗∗∗ −0.710∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.035)
Labor Input 0.584∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.051)
Lagged log(TFPR) 0.161∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.055)
Constant −3.846∗∗∗ −3.909∗∗∗ −1.294∗∗∗ −1.235∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.182) (0.089) (0.456)
Year F.E. No Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. No No Yes No
Individual F.E. No No No Yes
Observations 8,171 8,171 8,171 8,171
R2 0.310 0.317 0.872 0.905
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
I report the results of the regression of equation (1.2.5) for different sets of controls,
where the log(TFPR) Innovations are given as the estimated residual of the model of
equation (1.2.4), the Capital Stock is given by fixed assets and TFPR is defined as in
equation (1.2.3). In parentheses are heretoskedasticity robus standard errors.
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F Industry TFPR
Industry level TFPR appears is used in order to compare which firms are too small
relative to their productivity and which ones are too large in the data. Define
industry average marginal revenue products as:
MRPKs =
[
Ms∑
i=1
1
MRPKsi
psiysi
PsYs
]−1
=
[
Ms∑
i=1
1
(r + δ)(1 + τ ksi)
psiysi
PsYs
]−1
MRPLs =
[
Ms∑
i=1
1
MRPLsi
psiysi
PsYs
]−1
=
[
Ms∑
i=1
1
w(1 + τ lsi)
psiysi
PsYs
]−1
where Ys is as defined in the main text and Ps =
[∑Ms
i=1 p
1−ν
si
] 1
1−ν
is the industry
level price index. In the static problem, labor demand is given by:
lsi = (1− αs)
(
ν − 1
ν
)
psiysi
w(1 + τ lsi)
Industry s total labor demand is then given by
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Ls =
Ms∑
i=1
lsi = (1− αs)
(
ν − 1
ν
) Ms∑
i=1
psiysi
w(1 + τ lsi)
= (1− αs)
(
ν − 1
ν
) Ms∑
i=1
1
w(1 + τ lsi)
psiysi
PsYs
PsYs
= (1− αs)
(
ν − 1
ν
)
PsYs
MRPLs
Doing the same for capital, I can rewrite the industry average marginal revenue
products as:
MRPKs = αs
(
ν − 1
ν
)
PsYs
Ks
MRPLs = (1− αs)
(
ν − 1
ν
)
PsYs
Ls
If we were to rewrite Ys as a function of industry level capital and labor Ys =
TFPsK
αs
s L
1−αs
s ,
TFPs =
PsYs
Kαss L
1−αs
s
1
Ps
=
(
PsYs
Ks
)αs (PsYs
Ls
)1−αs
=
(
ν
ν − 1
)(
MRPKs
αs
)αs (
MRPLs
1− αs
)1−αs
= TFPRs
1
Ps
To measure this variable I will follow Hsieh and Klenow [2009]: the elasticity of
substitution used is ν = 3, and to measure the wedges they use output distortions
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and capital relative to labor distortions, a setup which has a one to one mapping to
this, but allows a more straightforward interpretation to infer them from the data.
The optimization problem is:
pisi = max
psi,ksi,lsi
(1− τ ∗ysi )psi(ysi)ysi − wlsi − (1 + τ ∗ksi )(r + δ)ksi
Distortions are measured as:
1 + τ ∗ksi =
αs
1− αs
wlsi
(r + δ)ksi
1− τ ∗ysi =
ν
ν − 1
wlsi
(1− αs)psiysi
I infer large capital distortions if the firm has a ratio of labor to capital that
is too high, compared to what you would expect given the industry’s labor shares.
The model infers high output distortions if the share of labor is low when compared
from what one would expect given the industry elasticity of output with respect to
labor. To remain as close as possible to Hsieh and Klenow [2009], I trim by 1%
the tails of the TFPR and TFPQ = z deviations from industry means measures
and the capital and output distortions and then recompute the industry average
TFPR.
The implied MRPL and MRPK with these wedges are
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MRPL∗si ≡ (1− αs)
(
ν − 1
ν
)
psiysi
lsi
=
w
1− τ ∗ysi
MRPK∗si ≡ αs
(
ν − 1
ν
)
psiysi
ksi
=
1 + τ ∗ksi
1− τ ∗ysi
(r + δ)
These wedges can be made to coincide with the definitions of MRPL and
MRPK in the main text (1.2.1)-(1.2.2) with the redefinitions:
1 + τ lsi =
1
1− τ ∗ysi
1 + τ ksi =
1 + τ ∗ksi
1− τ ∗ysi
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G Aggregate TFP Derivation
In order to compare aggregate TFP for different model calibrations, I will need to
do an analogue of the Hsieh and Klenow [2009] derivation of what is the efficient
level of TFP for the case of no labor. We can express aggregate TFP in terms of
aggregate TFPR ≡ PY/K
TFP =
Y
K
=
TFPR
P
P being the usual price index that results from monopolistic competition within
the model, and defining s ∈ S = K × B × Z
P =
( ∑
i=a,b,c
∫
S
p(y(s, i))1−νµi(s)
) 1
1−ν
Using the definition of firm TFPR ≡ pz, rewrite this same price index as
P =
( ∑
i=a,b,c
∫
S
[
TFPR(s, i)
z
]1−ν
µi(s)
) 1
1−ν
Thus, we can rewrite aggregate TFP as,
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TFP =
TFPR
P
=
[ ∑
i=a,b,c
∫
S
(
z
TFPR
TFPR(s, i)
)ν−1
µi(s)
] 1
ν−1
.
Consumer optimization tells us that firms should equalize TFPR, we know that
the efficient level of TFP is given when all firms are able to set TFPR = TFPR,
so
TFP e =
[ ∑
i=a,b,c
∫
S
zν−1µi(s)
] 1
ν−1
.
And define the ratio of actual to efficient TFP as
TFP
TFP e
=
[ ∑
i=a,b,c
∫
S
(
z
TFP e
TFPR
TFPR(s, i)
)ν−1
µi(s)
] 1
ν−1
.
Thus, for each parametrization we can compute how close this stationary distri-
bution if close to the efficient one using this formula, and the definitions of aggregate
output Y and capital K of equations (1.3.12)-(1.3.13).
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H Derivation of the Aggregate Price Index
This appendix derives the aggregate price index in section 2.5:
Pt =
[∑
s∈S
t∑
τ=−∞
P 1−ηsτt
]1/(1−η)
= P
1−η
σ−η
t
(
σ
Lt
) 1
σ−η
(µwt)
σ−1
σ−η
[∑
s∈S
t∑
τ=−∞
z
(1−σ)(1−η)
σ−η
sτt f
1−η
σ−η
sτt
]1/(1−η)
= P
1−η
σ−η
t
(
σ
Lt
) 1
σ−η
(µwt)
σ−1
σ−η
{∑
s∈S
t∑
τ=−∞
[z¯τzsτ (t− τ)z ]
(1−σ)(1−η)
σ−η
[
f¯τfsτ (t− τ)f
] 1−η
σ−η
}1/(1−η)
= P
1−η
σ−η
t
(
σ
Lt
) 1
σ−η
(µwt)
σ−1
σ−η z¯
1−σ
σ−η
t f¯
1
σ−η
t{∑
s∈S
∞∑
r=0
[
g
− (1−σ)(1−η)
σ−η
z g
− 1−η
σ−η
f
]r
rz
(1−σ)(1−η)
σ−η +f
1−η
σ−η
[
z
(1−σ)(1−η)
σ−η
sτ f
1−η
σ−η
sτ
]}1/(1−η)
=
(
σ
Lt
) 1
σ−1
(
µwt
z¯t
)
f¯
1
σ−1
t P˜
σ−η
σ−1
t
≈ (ΦΓ1)
σ−η
(σ−1)(1−η)
(
Lt
σf¯t
) 1
1−σ µwt
z¯t
(H.0.1)
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where Φ and Γ1 are constants:
Φ = EG
[
z
(1−σ)(1−η)
σ−η f
1−η
σ−η
]
Γ1 =
∞∑
r=0
g−r1 r
1 ≈ log(g1)1+1Γ(1 + 1)
where g1 =
[
g(1−σ)z gf
] 1−η
σ−η > 1
1 =
(
1− η
σ − η
)
[(1− σ)z + f ]
and Γ is the gamma function. We assume Φ < ∞. If the number of sectors is
sufficiently large, the approximation in line (H.0.1) is precise.
Vintage-Sector Mass is given by:
Msτt =
Xsτt
σwtfsτt
=
(
psτt
Pt
) (1−η)(σ−1)
(σ−η)
(
Lt
σfsτt
) σ−1
σ−η
=
(
Lt
σ
) σ−1
σ−η
(
µwt
Pt
) (η−1)(1−σ)
σ−η
(z1−ηsτt fsτt)
1−σ
σ−η
=
(
Lt
σ
) σ−1
σ−η
(
µwt
Pt
) (η−1)(1−σ)
σ−η
(z¯1−ηt f¯t)
1−σ
σ−η [gτ−t2 (t− τ)2 ]
(
z1−ηsτ fsτ
) 1−σ
σ−η
=
(
Lt
σ
) σ−1
σ−η
(
µwt
Pt
) (η−1)(1−σ)
σ−η
(z¯1−ηt f¯t)
1−σ
σ−η M˜sτt
=
(
Lt
σf¯t
)
P˜ η−1t M˜sτt
So that the share of mass is given by
Msτt
Mt
=
[gτ−t2 (t− τ)2 ](z1−ηsτt fsτt)
1−σ
σ−η∑
s∈S
∑t
τ=−∞[g
τ−t
2 (t− τ)2 ](z1−ηsτt fsτt)
1−σ
σ−η
=
[gτ−t2 (t− τ)2 ](z1−ηsτt fsτt)
1−σ
σ−η
M˜t
And growth of a vintage:
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Msτt+1
Msτt
=
msτt+1Mt+1
msτtMt
=
msτt+1M˜t+1
msτtM˜t
(
Lt+1
Lt
) σ−1
σ−η
(
Ptwt+1
Pt+1wt
) (1−σ)(η−1)
σ−η
(g1−ηz gf )
1−σ
σ−η
=
msτt+1M˜t+1
msτtM˜t
g
σ−1
σ−η
L
(gL
gf
) 1
σ−1
gz
[
P˜t
P˜t+1
]σ−η
σ−1

(1−σ)(η−1)
σ−η
(g1−ηz gf )
1−σ
σ−η
=
msτt+1M˜t+1
msτtM˜t
g
σ−1
σ−η
L g
1−η
σ−η
L
(
gfg
1−σ
z
) η−1
σ−η
[
P˜t
P˜t+1
]1−η
(g1−ηz gf )
1−σ
σ−η
=
msτt+1M˜t+1
msτtM˜t
gL
(
gfg
1−σ
z
) η−1
σ−η
[
P˜t
P˜t+1
]1−η
(g1−ηz gf )
1−σ
σ−η
=
msτt+1M˜t+1
msτtM˜t
gL
gf
[
P˜t
P˜t+1
]1−η
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I Distribution of sales and firms across classes
The distribution of sales and plants and across classes within a vintage is:
Prob
(
Xsτt
Xτt
≤ x and Msτt
Mτt
≤ m
)
= Prob
([
z(1−σ)f
] 1−η
σ−η ≤ Φ1x and
[
z(1−η)f
] 1−σ
σ−η ≤ Φ2m
)
So, the vector of market shares y = log(xsτt msτt)
′ is an affine transformation of
the vector of technology draws w = log(zsτt fsτt)
′: y = Aw, where the elements
of matrix A are:
a11 =
(1− η)(1− σ)
(σ − η) log(Φ1) , a12 =
1− η
(σ − η) log(Φ1) ,
a21 =
(1− η)(1− σ)
(σ − η) log(Φ2) , a22 =
1− σ
(σ − η) log(Φ2) .
Since w is distributed normally with mean parameter 0 and variance parameter Σ,
market shares exp(y) are distributed according to a log normal with mean parameter
0 and variance parameter AΣA′.
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J Truncation of the Log-Normal Distribution
The standard way of generating a truncated bivariate normal is to reject observa-
tions outside the confidence interval. This alternative does not work for us because
we would like to keep the same random draws for all parameter values. These notes
show the computation procedure.
We start with a Cholesky decomposition to generate a bivariate normal. Given
a vector of two standard normal draws n, (Z, F )′ = An is a bivariate normal with
the desired variance and correlation parameters if A is the Cholesky decomposition
of the variance-covariance matrix. Matrix A has elements
a11 = (varZ)
.5
a12 = 0
a21 = covZF/a11 = corrZF × (varF ).5
a22 =
[
varF + a221
].5
= (varF ).5 × (1− corrZF )
Truncation Denote with Φ the cdf of the normal distribution and with Φ−1 its
inverse. Given the distribution of (Z, F )′, we would like to reject values of Z in the
upper truncZ share of the unconditional distribution, and values of F in the lower
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truncF share of its unconditional distribution. Parameters truncZ and truncF
typically take values around 0.05. We transform the draws from the uniform distri-
bution originally generating n to deliver values of Z and F in the desired interval.
Using (Z, F )′ = An, Z = (varZ).5n1. Then,
uz = (1− truncZ)U (J.0.1)
and n1 = Φ
−1(uz) has the desired truncation. Again expanding (Z, F )′ = An, yields
F = a21n1+a22n2. Let uf be the uniform distribution generating that unconditional
distribution of F .
uf = Φ
(
F
(V arF ).5
)
uf ≥ truncF ⇔
(
F
(V arF ).5
)
> Φ−1(truncF )
⇒ a21n1 + a22n2 ≥ (V arF ).5Φ−1(truncF )
⇒ n2 ≥ (V arF )
.5Φ−1(truncF )
a22
− a21
a22
n1
u2 = Φ(n2) ≥ Φ
[
(V arF ).5Φ−1(truncF )
a22
− a21
a22
n1
]
≡ uf (J.0.2)
So, u2 truncated at uf for every value of n1 yields the desired truncation of F .
Computation procedure Let u1 and u2 be draws from U [0, 1]. From equation
(J.0.1), get uz = (1− truncZ)u1 and n1 = Φ−1(uz) and Z = varZ .5n1. Variable Z
has a normal distribution with its upper tail truncated at truncZ. For each value
of n1, let uf ∈ (0, 1) be the expression defined in equation (J.0.2). And let
uf = uf + u2(1− uf )
110
Then, uf is a uniform distribution on [uf , 1] and n2 == Φ
−1(uf ) be the correspond-
ing truncated normal. Then, variable F == a21n1 +a22n2 has a normal distribution
with mean parameter zero and variance parameter V arF , and its lower tail is trun-
cated at truncF . The correlation parameter between Z and F is corrZF .
111
